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Abstract: The public trust doctrine originated—and has persisted in American 
law—as antimonopoly protection. From the time of its recognition by American 
courts in the early nineteenth century, the doctrine has protected the public 
against private monopolization of natural resources, beginning with tidal waters 
and wild animals. Ensuing public trust case law has extended the scope of trust 
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protection to other important natural resources, including non-tidal and non-
navigable waters, and land-based resources like parks. Courts are now consider-
ing the trust doctrine’s application to the atmosphere. Although there is a con-
siderable body of legal scholarship on the public trust, the doctrine’s antimo-
nopoly core has not been explored. In this Article, we remedy that oversight by 
examining the public trust’s justification as an antimonopoly sentiment. Anti-
monopoly policy is at least as old in American law as the public trust and cer-
tainly more politically prominent. Viewing the public trust through the lens of 
antimonopoly helps to explain the history and evolution of this doctrine and its 
overriding goal of preventing irreversible commitments of natural resources to 
private monopolization. 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly two hundred years, the public trust doctrine (“PTD”) has 
ensured that Americans have access to select natural resources, protecting 
those resources from privatization.1 At its core, the PTD prohibits sover-
eigns from alienating these natural resources2 and requires sovereign pro-
tection of trust resources for future public use and enjoyment.3 As this Arti-
cle explains, antimonopoly is the essence of the PTD, preventing privatiza-
tion of certain resources used by the public, such as tidal waters and wild-
life. Without this limit on alienation many valuable natural resources would, 
by now, be privately owned and thus inaccessible to the public. 
The roots of the PTD lie in seventeenth-century English political 
thought, particularly the writings of John Locke. According to Locke, a per-
son should only be able to acquire property that he could productively use, 
“whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.”4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76–77 (N.J. 1821) (rejecting an attempted landowner 
monopolization of tidal oyster beds). 
 2 See id. (protecting public access to tidal oyster beds); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970) 
(stating that public trust property “must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held 
available for use by the general public”). 
 3 See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 
1437, 1466 (asserting that “preservation of access to wildlife lies at the heart of the American 
public trust doctrine”); Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doc-
trine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 419 
(2015) (asserting “a public trust claim inquires as to whether the sovereign is protecting trust as-
sets sufficiently to safeguard the interest of present and future beneficiaries”). 
 4 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (1690). Locke posited:  
Nature did well in setting limits to private property through limits to how much men 
can work and limits to how much they need. No man’s labour could tame or appro-
priate all the land; no man’s enjoyment could consume more than a small part; so 
that it was impossible for any man in this way to infringe on the right of another, or 
acquire property to the disadvantage of his neighbor . . . . 
Id. 
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This Lockean sentiment migrated to American political thought, most prom-
inently through Thomas Jefferson’s advocacy of a republic of small land-
holders and widespread distribution of resources.5 Preserving public rights 
to access natural resources, including navigable waters, served Jacksonian 
America’s aversion to concentrated wealth and special privileges for elites.6 
Later in the nineteenth century, monopolization became a widespread public 
concern as corporations amassed economic and political power and threat-
ened to assert exclusive use of natural resources.7 The rise of concentrated 
industrial power in the years following the Civil War led to reform move-
ments like state efforts to regulate railroads and the federal enactment of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and Sherman Antitrust Acts, which 
sought to protect the public from the adverse effects of monopolization.8 
Promoting widespread public access to navigable waters—the essential 
arteries of commerce—developed as part of a larger effort in nineteenth-
century America to resist monopoly power.9 Antimonopoly sentiment pro-
duced limits on land acquisition in federal homestead and preemption laws10 
and was at the center of the founding of western water law, which rejected 
common law riparian water rights because they gave monopoly rights to 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 62 (1968) (“The 
small landholders are the most precious part of a state.” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 13, 1776)). 
 6 See Kenneth Lipartito, The Antimonopoly Tradition, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 991, 997 (2013) 
(explaining Jacksonian politics as antimonopoly). 
 7 See Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land Law, 28 
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 157 (2016) (describing how antimonopoly policy permeates American 
public land law); Lipartito, supra note 6, at 991 (stating that “‘[a]ntimonopoly’ was one of the 
most powerful words in the lexicon of nineteenth century America” and outlining the development 
of antimonopoly in the business world); Alan Brinkley, The Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal 
State: The Case of Thurman Arnold, 80 J. AM. HIST. 557, 557 (1993) (“For more than half a cen-
tury—from the moment large industrial combinations began to emerge in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century to the late years of the Great Depression—the question of monopoly power was 
among the central issues of American public life.”). 
 8 Interstate Commerce Act, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); see Brinkley, supra note 7, at 567 (asserting that the idea of antitrust 
was part of “the larger antimonopoly impulse”); Lipartito, supra note 6, at 991, 999 (explaining 
that antimonopoly policy “took aim at private actors who sought to advance their own interests 
against those of the broad public,” and that “[b]etween 1870 and 1900, the United States went 
through a corporation revolution”). See generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust 
Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000) (outlining 
American antitrust law, beginning with the Sherman Act of 1890). 
 9 See Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public 
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 
489 (1997) (“In an era that did not clearly separate regulatory power from proprietary rights, pub-
lic ownership of navigable waters was the key to promoting, controlling, and avoiding monopolies 
in the most important instrumentality of commerce in mid-nineteenth century America.”). 
 10 Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 7, at 169–73 (describing the antimonopoly tenets underlying 
early American homestead and preemption laws). 
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shoreland landowners.11 Public rights to hunt on private, unenclosed lands 
were also commonplace, reflecting nineteenth-century America’s preference 
for public subsistence hunting over land speculators’ right to exclude, at 
least until they invested in fences.12  
Nineteenth-century case law established the duty of states to prevent 
monopoly control of certain natural resources.13 In 1842, the United States 
Supreme Court’s first PTD case disallowed a landowner’s attempted mo-
nopoly control of oysters in the Raritan River.14 A half-century later, in 
1892, the Court again invoked the PTD to prevent monopolization of Chi-
cago Harbor, invalidating a state grant of lands beneath navigable waters to 
a railroad.15 The Court soon added another foundational decision in 1896, 
establishing public ownership of wildlife by upholding a state hunting law 
that prohibited the transportation of harvested wild birds out of the state.16 
As with lands under navigable or tidal waters, the Court concluded that wild 
animals were owned by states in “trust for the benefit of all people, and not 
. . . for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public 
good.”17 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, American law had evolved to 
recognize sovereign responsibilities to protect public rights in both naviga-
ble waters and their underlying beds, as well as in wildlife.18 During the 
twentieth century, courts increasingly acknowledged the relative scarcity of 
natural resources and the vulnerability of these resources to private monop-
olization, and in turn responded by extending public trust protection to other 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Michael C. Blumm, Antimonopoly and the Radical Lockean Origins of Western Water 
Law, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y L. REV. 377, 380–81 (2014) (reviewing DAVID 
SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUS-
TICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012)). 
 12 See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. 244, 351 (Const. App. 1818). 
 13 See infra notes 29–118 (discussing nineteenth-century cases reflecting the public trust doc-
trine’s (“PTD”) antimonopoly tenets). 
 14 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 408, 411, 418 (1842) (holding that the 
PTD preempted a landowner from establishing control over oysters in tidal waters). 
 15 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (deciding that the PTD prevented the 
state of Illinois from transferring substantial parts of the bed of Chicago Harbor to a private rail-
road company); see Sax, supra note 2, at 489 (referring to Illinois Central as “the lodestar in 
American public trust law”). See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins 
of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 799 (2004) (providing an extensive background on the case). 
 16 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 535 (1896). 
 17 Id. at 529; see also Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1459–61 (discussing the public trust 
in wildlife, beginning with Geer). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the sovereign owner-
ship of wildlife in Horne v. Department of Agriculture. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015); see infra 
note 190. 
 18 See infra notes 38–92, 107–118 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century 
public trust protections for tidelands and wildlife). 
2017] The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine 5 
resources, including non-navigable-in-fact waters and upland parks.19 
Courts also recognized that private monopolization would jeopardize fun-
damental public uses of natural resources beyond navigation, commerce, 
and fishing—the original triad of protected activities.20 Consequently, many 
courts have recognized that the PTD protects recreation access, and others 
have decided that the doctrine provides environmental protection for trust 
resources to benefit future generations.21 
Nevertheless, the PTD has to date only had marginal effects on modern 
natural resources allocation. Some potential reasons include the fact that the 
doctrine’s recognition of public property rights is a counterpoise to an 
overwhelming commitment to private rights in American property law. 
Moreover, the PTD encourages courts to view skeptically governmental 
management of trust resources when that management threatens privatiza-
tion, which runs against the dominant view of judicial deference to govern-
ment legislatures and agencies.22 The PTD also is a fractured doctrine, with 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 200–243 and accompanying text (outlining public trust extensions to an 
increasing number of natural resources, including non-navigable waters, such as seasonal lakes, 
and other resources like upland parks). 
 20 See infra notes 189–273 and accompanying text (describing important cases that have ex-
tended public trust protection beyond uses for navigation, commerce, and fishing). 
 21 See infra notes 189–273 and accompanying text; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., 
Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that “the doctrine has been expanded to protect 
additional water-related uses such as swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of 
rivers and lakes, and preservation of flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands”); Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (acknowledging 
that the “principal values” the plaintiffs sought to protect were “recreational and ecological—the 
scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and 
feeding by birds,” and concluding that “protection of these values is among the purposes of the 
public trust”). For instance, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained:  
[W]e believe that by [the sovereign reservation], a public trust was imposed upon all 
the waters of the kingdom. That is, we find the public interest in the waters of the 
kingdom was understood to necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of 
a concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future genera-
tions and to assure that the waters of our land are put to reasonable and beneficial 
uses. This is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State may do with the 
property as it pleases; rather, we comprehend the nature of the State’s ownership as 
a retention of such authority to assure the continued existence and beneficial appli-
cation of the resource for the common good. 
658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982). 
 22 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive depart-
ment’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of defer-
ence to administrative interpretations.”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, 
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (discussing judicial deference for agency interpre-
tations of statutes first established in Chevron). 
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decidedly different effects in different states.23 For these reasons, the PTD 
has operated below the proverbial radar in many jurisdictions. 
But the American population continues to grow, exerting increased 
pressure on limited natural resources. As private threats to the environment 
become clearer, PTD protection against privatization may become more 
prominent. Expansions in the scope of the doctrine in the past occurred in 
response to the “felt necessities of the time.”24 Similar felt necessities will 
influence its future in the twenty-first century, perhaps strengthening anti-
monopoly protection for natural resources. 
In Part I, this Article links the origins, evolution, and contemporary 
significance of the PTD to antimonopoly policy.25 Part I outlines early Amer-
ican public trust cases in which courts originally recognized the relevance 
of the PTD in Atlantic tidal waters, but soon extended the doctrine to inland 
navigable waters, illustrating the doctrine’s usefulness in protecting against 
landowner monopolization of public water resources and wildlife.26 Part II 
turns to the modern era, discussing how the PTD has extended and 
strengthened antimonopoly protection over natural resources, expanding the 
scope of the resources subject to the doctrine and the public uses protected 
by it.27 This Article concludes by suggesting that trust advocates would ad-
vance PTD case law by encouraging courts to recognize the antimonopoly 
impulses underlying the public trust.28 
I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: 
ANTIMONOPOLIZATION OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 
The antimonopoly notion that the public holds rights to access select 
natural resources originated in Roman law. As the Roman Emperor Justini-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the 
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 425 (1989) (“The public trust 
doctrine is complicated—there are fifty-one public trust doctrines in this country alone.”). 
 24 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). According to the famous 
dictum of Justice Holmes, the law must evolve:  
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of 
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fel-
low-men, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s devel-
opment through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only 
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.  
Id. 
 25 See infra notes 29–118 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 29–118 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 119–323 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 324–330 and accompanying text. 
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an explained in a sixth century legal treatise, there are “things which are 
naturally everybody’s . . . air, flowing water, the sea, and the sea-shore.”29 
English law adopted this Roman law concept in the Magna Carta of 1215, 
which included a provision promising public uses of navigable and tidal 
waters for navigation, commerce, and fishing purposes while restricting 
private monopolies that would interfere with those uses.30 
In the nineteenth century, the PTD crossed the Atlantic and eventually 
became a fundamental tenet of American property law.31 In 1821 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court first announced the PTD as a means to guard against 
private monopolization of certain natural resources, and as a basis for divid-
ing public and private ownership of waterways.32 By mid-century, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court adopted the doctrine as federal law,33 applying it 
to resolve ownership of submerged lands.34 As the nineteenth century pro-
gressed, the PTD moved upstream to apply to inland waters that were im-
portant to commerce.35 By the turn of the twentieth century, the doctrine not 
only protected public access to both navigable-in-fact and tidal waters,36 it 
also forbade large-scale public conveyance of natural resources into private 
hands.37 
                                                                                                                           
 29 JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 55 (Paul Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987). 
 30 See HARRISON C. DUNNING, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.01 (3d ed. 2016); see, 
e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1894) (stating that water is a public resource “for 
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all 
the king’s subjects,” and outlining English restrictions of privatization of tidal resources); see also 
Sax, supra note 2, at 475–77 (discussing the Roman and English origins of the American public 
trust doctrine); Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 465 (identifying navigation, commerce, and fishing as 
“traditional purposes” of the public trust doctrine). The California Supreme Court, in City of 
Berkeley v. Superior Court, credited that history when it stated: 
The doctrine that the public owns the right to tidelands for purposes such as com-
merce, navigation and fishing originated in Roman law, which held the public’s 
right to such lands to be “illimitable and unrestrainable” and incapable of individual 
exclusive appropriation. The English common law developed similar limitations up-
on private authority over such property: the rights of the public prevailed over the 
rights of private persons claiming under tideland grants made by the crown. 
606 P.2d 362, 364–65 (Cal. 1980) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Note, The Public Trust in 
Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 n.7 (1970)). 
 31 See generally Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of Ameri-
can Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (“The public trust is a fundamental doctrine in 
American property law and should be recognized much more widely than it is today.”). 
 32 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76–77 (N.J. 1821). 
 33 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 418 (1842). 
 34 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). 
 35 See infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century inland PTD 
cases). 
 36 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 
(1877); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851); Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 
418; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76–77. 
 37 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892). 
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A. Prohibiting Landowner Monopolization of Public Water Resources 
A central purpose of the early American PTD was to preserve public 
access to navigable-in-fact38 and tidal39 waters and the lands submerged 
beneath them.40 Historically, navigation and commerce were overlapping 
concepts41 because the ability to navigate waterways was essential to com-
merce before efficient travel overland by railroad and highways emerged.42 
Consequently, maintaining public access to navigable waters was a para-
mount public purpose. 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). In The Daniel Ball, Justice Ste-
phen J. Field explained that rivers are navigable in fact:  
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as 
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters 
of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction 
from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition 
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which 
commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the cus-
tomary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. 
Id. 
 39 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (“[W]e reaffirm our 
longstanding precedents which hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership 
of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.”). Tidal lands are lands subject to 
the ebb and flow of tides. Id. 
 40 See Richard R. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647 (1986) (“The public 
trust doctrine historically concerned public rights (traditionally, commerce, navigation, and fish-
ing) in navigable waters and their submerged beds. Accordingly, the geographical application of 
the doctrine turned on the meaning of navigable water.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 41 See DUNNING, supra note 30 (‘“Navigation’ and ‘commerce’ were clearly overlapping 
concepts in the historic formulation of the public right. . . . Typically the public right was asserted 
for ‘our great passageways of commerce and navigation,’ making clear the centrality of commer-
cial navigation.”); see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. 
L.J. 235, 239 (2003) (“Transportation is . . . a fundamental component of economic growth. It is 
the infrastructure foundation upon which the rest of the economy is built.”). 
 42 See LOUIS C. HUNTER, STEAMBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS: AN ECONOMIC AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL HISTORY 3–4 (1994) (Describing how sea travel was the preferred method of 
transportation during the eighteenth century, because “[i]n America, roads were especially poor, 
the cost of carriage high, and the time of trips very slow. Except to serve local needs highway 
transport played a minor role in commercial intercourse. Rivers made up the principal inland wa-
terways . . . .”); Lazarus, supra note 40, at 636 (“Commerce was primarily waterborne; the rivers 
served as highways for pioneers and supplied power for industry. Accordingly, cities and towns 
invariably lined major waterways, and natural ports were a prerequisite to developing a major 
metropolitan area.”); Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 431–33 (Describing the significance of major 
rivers to early American transportation “[t]o the early settlers, the rivers furnished paths of explo-
ration and avenues for the fur trade and log floats. Due to the density of the forests and the diffi-
culty of road construction, the watercourses afforded logical areas for settlement. Fishing was 
significant, both for commercial and subsistence purposes.”). 
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In 1821, in Arnold v. Mundy the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a 
landowner’s attempt to monopolize oyster harvesting on tidal flats in the 
Raritan River, a decision that upheld that state’s sovereign ownership of 
tidal waters and the lands beneath them.43 Two decades later, in Martin v. 
Waddell’s Lessee, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that New Jer-
sey held the submerged lands in the Raritan River in trust for its citizens.44 
In so doing, the Court extended states’ sovereign ownership of submerged 
tidal lands to all original states and, shortly thereafter, to all states.45 By the 
turn of the twentieth century, the Court recognized state public trust obliga-
tions in inland, navigable-in-fact waters, protecting those waters from pri-
vate monopolization as well.46 
1. Preventing Monopolization of Wildlife Resources in Tidal Waters 
The earliest American public trust cases protected shellfish harvesting 
from private monopolization in tidal waters. The 1821 decision of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold established the state’s sovereign 
ownership of tidal waters in the Raritan River and the lands underlying 
those waters.47 Two decades later, in 1842, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the New Jersey court’s ruling and ratified public access rights to 
the Raritan River and Bay.48 The Raritan River is therefore the homeland of 
the American PTD. 
Arnold, which laid the foundation for the American PTD, rejected a 
landowner’s attempted monopolization of oysters in the Raritan River.49 
Robert Arnold, who owned land adjacent to the river, claimed an exclusive 
right to harvest adjacent oyster beds based on a chain of title dating to a 
grant from the Duke of York, who, in turn, had acquired title in the seven-
teenth century from his brother, Charles II, King of England.50 After pur-
chasing a farm adjacent to the river, Arnold planted oysters in the riverbed 
below the high water mark and then drove off would-be oyster harvesters.51 
                                                                                                                           
 43 6 N.J.L. at 78. 
 44 41 U.S. at 417–18 (disagreeing with the plaintiff that Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 93, was decided in 
error, and instead upholding the reasoning in Arnold). 
 45 Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 224 (extending sovereign rights to the submerged lands of new 
states under the “equal footing” doctrine); see infra notes 80–83 (discussing this case). 
 46 See infra notes 84–92 (discussing the march of the PTD inland). 
 47 6 N.J.L. at 78. Actually, a decade before the Arnold decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court recognized public rights in the inland Susquehanna River in Carson v. Blazer. 2 Binn. 475 
(Pa. 1810); see infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 48 Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 417. 
 49 6 N.J.L. at 78. 
 50 Id. at 45–46, 65–66. 
 51 Id. at 65–66. Arnold’s predecessor, Coddington, had also attempted to assert an exclusive 
right to the oysters, “but the people had always disputed that right, had entered upon [the oyster 
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To test the legality of Arnold’s assertion of an exclusive right to the oysters, 
Benajah Mundy led a small fleet upriver and harvested some of them.52 
As anticipated, Arnold filed suit against Mundy.53 At trial, Mundy 
claimed that Arnold’s exclusive title extended only to the high water mark,54 
and that his fleet had lawfully taken oysters under the public’s right to har-
vest a publicly owned natural resource.55 The New Jersey trial court found 
Mundy’s assertions persuasive and held in his favor; Arnold appealed.56 
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision. Chief 
Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick agreed with the lower court that Arnold’s title 
ended at the high water mark, and thus did not extend to the riverbed that 
provided a habitat for the oysters.57 Kirkpatrick differentiated navigable 
waters, such as the tidal Raritan River, from streams and rivers “where the 
tide neither ebbs nor flows.”58 Although private title for non-tidal waters 
reached the middle of the water’s channel, he announced that upland title 
adjacent to navigable waters ended at the high water mark.59 Consequently, 
the public had a right to access the bed of the navigable Raritan River and 
to harvest the attached oysters; thus Arnold had no right to exclude the pub-
lic.60 
                                                                                                                           
flats], and taken oysters from it, when they pleased, and if opposed by Coddington . . . the strong-
est usually prevailed.” Id. at 65. 
 52 Id. at 66. Kirkpatrick reported that Mundy had taken oysters “merely with a view of trying 
the plaintiff’s pretended right, and not with a view of injuring the [oyster] bed, or taking the oys-
ters further than was necessary for this purpose.” Id. at 66. 
 53 Id. at 65. 
 54 The high water mark is “not . . . a physical mark made upon the ground by the waters; it 
means the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides.” Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935). The ordinary high tide is “the mean high tide line,” which 
is “a mean of all the high tides.” Id. at 26. 
 55 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 66. 
 56 Id. at 14–15. 
 57 Id. at 10. 
 58 Id. The court found: 
[A] grant of land to a subject or citizen, bounded upon a fresh water stream or river, 
where the tide neither ebbs nor flows, extends to the middle of the channel of such 
river; but that a grant bounded upon a navigable river, or other water, where the tide 
does ebb or flow, extends to the edge of the water only, that is to say, to high water 
mark, when the tide is high, and to low water mark, when the tide is low, but it ex-
tends no farther. 
Id. Kirkpatrick proceeded to explain that “[t]he intermediate space . . . between the high water and 
low water mark, may be exclusively appropriated by the owner of the adjacent land, by building 
thereon docks, wharves, storehouses, salt-pans, or other structures which exclude the reflow of the 
water.” Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 76–77. Kirkpatrick ruled:  
[B]y the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all the social rights [and] 
by the civil law, which formerly governed almost the whole civilized world [and] by 
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Consistent with his determination that the riverbed was publicly 
owned, Justice Kirkpatrick decided that the King’s grant to the Duke of 
York was not merely a private proprietary estate but also a grant of sover-
eign powers.61 Because the King, as sovereign, could not claim exclusive 
title to navigable waterways, he could not grant more than he possessed, 
since that would interfere with public rights.62 Therefore, a successor to the 
title of the King had no power to grant to a landowner like Arnold the right 
to exclude the public from use of beds of the Raritan River and Bay.63 
Moreover, the state of New Jersey succeeded to the King’s sovereign pow-
ers and duties upon statehood.64 
According to Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, there were three kinds of prop-
erty: (1) private property, owned by individuals; (2) public property, which 
the sovereign may grant to private individuals, in the service of public 
good; and (3) common property, including “the air, the running water, the 
sea, the fish, and the wild beasts,” held by the sovereign for public use.65 
Because it would be impractical for common property to “be vested in all 
the people,” ownership is in the sovereign “to be held, protected, and regu-
                                                                                                                           
the common law of England . . . the navigable rivers in which the tide land under the 
water, for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, suste-
nance, and all other uses of the water and its products (a few things excepted), are 
common to all the citizens, and . . . each [citizen] has a right to use them according 
to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use . . . . [T]he proper-
ty, indeed, strictly speaking is vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in him, not for 
his own use, but for the use of the citizen; that is, for [the citizen’s] direct and im-
mediate enjoyment. 
Id. 
 61 Id. at 70–71. 
 62 Id. at 34. The court explained:  
It is manifest [the king] could give to the duke of York, and his assigns, no greater 
right and power over the navigable waters here than he himself would have pos-
sessed; and, if the words of the grant are more extensive, all beyond his legitimate 
right is absolutely void. As he could only possess a right in these navigable waters, 
subject to the common right of fishery of the inhabitants, which was unalienable, the 
duke of York, and all claiming under him, would take the right of the king, subject 
to the same restriction. 
Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 13. Kirkpatrick clarified by stating that the royal rights that had passed to the state of 
New Jersey, in its sovereign capacity, and therefore the state “cannot make a direct and absolute 
grant, divesting all the citizens of their common right; such a grant, or a law authorizing such a 
grant, would be contrary to the great principles of our constitution, and never could be borne by a 
free people.” Id. at 78. 
 65 Id. at 71. 
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lated for the common use and benefit.”66 Subsequent decisions have 
agreed.67 
Two decades later, the United States Supreme Court adopted Justice 
Kirkpatrick’s reasoning in Waddell’s Lessee, another controversy over ac-
cess to oysters in the Raritan River and Bay, thereby extending the public 
rights recognized in Arnold to all original thirteen states.68 In Waddell’s Les-
see, a lessee of William Waddell claimed title to a 100-acre tract of oyster 
beds below the high water mark in Raritan Bay, again based on grants from 
King Charles to his brother, the Duke of York, in 1664 and 1674 that con-
veyed “all the lands, islands, soils, rivers, harbors, mines, minerals, quarries, 
woods, marshes, waters, lakes, fishings, hawkings, and fowlings,” among 
other things.69 Concurrently, Merrit Martin held a leasehold in those oyster 
beds under an 1824 New Jersey statute.70 To establish exclusive access to 
the oysters, Waddell’s lessee sued to eject Martin, in what appeared to be an 
effort to get the New Jersey courts to reconsider the Arnold rule or have the 
Supreme Court overturn it.71 This effort bore fruit at trial when a jury ruled 
in favor of Waddell’s lessee, finding that the claim based on the King’s land 
grant was superior to the subsequent state lease.72 
Although the United States Supreme Court also recognized the royal 
charter, it reversed the lower court, stating that New Jersey had sovereign 
ownership of the submerged lands because the state was the successor to the 
English Crown.73 Therefore, Martin’s harvesting lease from the state was 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick elaborated on the concept of common property by stating that 
the king could not 
appropriate it to himself, or to the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of it 
is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary pow-
er; and that, in theory at least, could not exist in a free government, such as England 
has always claimed to be. 
Id. at 72–73. 
 67 See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of PTD case law). 
 68 See Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 382. The Court opined: 
There is no language in this royal grant that will pass the sea and its arms, as private 
property . . . . We contend, first, that the sea and its arms were part of the regalia or 
prerogative rights of the crown. And secondly, that they could not, upon a sound 
construction of this charter, pass as private property, to the Duke, in his private ca-
pacity. 
Id. at 382. 
 69 Id. at 370. 
 70 Id. at 408. 
 71 See id. at 407. 
 72 See id. at 405. 
 73 Id. at 417. 
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superior to other land ownership claims.74 Writing for the Court, Chief Jus-
tice Roger Taney considered the nature of the King’s original rights,75 and 
whether those rights changed when they passed to the Duke of York, and 
eventually to Waddell, as the landowner.76 Scrutinizing the royal charters, 
Taney concluded that “the sea and its arms are peculiarly and pre-eminently 
in the king in respect to their uses; all of which, at common law, are public, 
and they are held by the king for the public benefit.”77 He decided that the 
Duke and his successors, Waddell and his lessee, merely stood in place of 
the King, meaning the private ownership was subject to the public’s prior 
right of access; thus, Martin had no right to exclude the public from using 
the submerged lands.78 Like Arnold, Waddell’s Lessee prevented private 
monopolization of public resources in tidal waterways.79 
Three years after it decided Waddell’s Lessee, the United States Su-
preme Court extended state sovereign ownership of submerged tidal lands 
to all states, not just those formed from British colonies, in a dispute over 
rights to submerged lands in Mobile Bay, Alabama.80 Because all new states 
were admitted to the Union on an “equal footing” with the original states,81 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. The Court concluded that the Duke had later surrendered governmental power to the 
Crown, and that “when the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and 
took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before 
belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the 
state.” Id. 
 75 Id. at 409. The Court stated:  
We do not propose to meddle with the point which was very much discussed at the 
bar, as to the power of the king, since Magna Charta, to grant to a subject a portion 
of the soil covered by the navigable waters of the kingdom, so as to give him an 
immediate and exclusive right of fishery, either for shell-fish or floating fish, within 
the limits of his grant.  
Id. at 410. 
 76 Id. at 411. According to the Court, an essential question was whether, in the Duke’s hands, 
the public resources were intended to be a trust for the common use of the new community about 
to be established; or private property to be parceled out and sold to individuals, for his own bene-
fit? And in deciding a question like this, we must not look merely to the strict technical meaning 
of the words of the letters-patent. The laws and institutions of England, the history of the times, 
the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction given to it, and the usages under it, for 
the century and more which has since elapsed, are all entitled to consideration and weight. Id. 
 77 Id. at 383. But public waterways are not reserved exclusively for public use. As the Su-
preme Court observed in Waddell’s Lessee, natural forces, such as alluvion (i.e., an increase in an 
area of land due to sediment deposited by a river), or practices such as wharfing out may produce 
private rights. Id. 
 78 Id. at 412–13. 
 79 See id. at 417; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 58. 
 80 Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230. 
 81 Id. at 224 (“Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, the munici-
pal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their respective borders, and they, 
and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects whatever.”). See generally 
James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust 
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the Court in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan ruled that the new states owned 
submerged tidal lands due to an implicit conveyance in their statehood 
acts.82 Pollard’s Lessee therefore recognized public trust rights and accom-
panying antimonopoly protection in tidal submerged lands in all states.83 
2. Extending Antimonopoly Protection to Inland Waters 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Waddell’s Lessee and Pollard’s Les-
see might have been interpreted to confine public rights to coastal areas 
subject to tidal influence, leaving the vast interior of the American conti-
nent, with its large rivers and lakes, subject to private monopolization.84 But 
in the early nineteenth century state courts began the process of enlarging 
the scope of public rights in waterways to include those waters that were 
navigable-in-fact. For example, in 1810, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled in Carson v. Blazer that a riparian landowner had “no exclusive right 
to fish in the Susquehanna River immediately in front of his lands . . . [be-
cause] the right to fisheries in [a large freshwater river not subject to tidal 
influence] is vested in the state, and open to all.”85 In 1826, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court declared that navigable waters “invariably and 
exclusively belong to the public.”86 Three decades later, in 1856, the Iowa 
Supreme Court concluded that actual navigability, not the presence of the 
tides, was the defining characteristic of public waters.87 
These decisions were emblematic of the PTD’s inland march. The 
United States Supreme Court began to ratify this expansion of public rights 
in 1851 in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, in which the Court upheld a con-
gressional extension of admiralty jurisdiction to non-tidal waters used for 
                                                                                                                           
Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 88 (1997) (asserting that the PTD originated in part 
from early equal footing cases). 
 82 44 U.S. at 228–29; see Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 443–47 (discussing the origins of the 
equal footing doctrine). In Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, the Court declared:  
Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory 
within her limits, subject to the common law, to the same extent that Georgia pos-
sessed it before she ceded it to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is 
to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the 
original states . . . . 
44 U.S. at 228–29. 
 83 See Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230; see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 1 (“The new States ad-
mitted into the Union since the adoption of the constitution have the same rights as the original 
states in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions.”). 
 84 See Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230; Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 418. 
 85 2 Binn. at 477–78 (concluding that it would be “highly unreasonable” to limit the scope of 
navigability to tidal waters). 
 86 Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268, 271 (1826). 
 87 McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 30 (1856). 
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commerce.88 In that case, involving the advent of steamships that opened 
inland waters to commerce, the Court explained that in the United States 
there were “thousands of miles of public navigable water, including lakes 
and rivers in which there is no tide.”89 Consequently, in a land with numer-
ous inland waters capable of supporting commercial navigation, the tidal 
limit on the public rights in waterways inherited from England was a poor 
fit.90 A quarter-century later, in 1877, in Barney v. City of Keokuk, a non-
admiralty case, the Court extended public rights to navigable-in-fact waters, 
refusing to draw a distinction between tidal and non-tidal waters for the 
purposes of navigation and sovereign ownership.91 By the turn of the twen-
tieth century, American courts thus had expanded the reach of public rights 
to include not just coastal waters subject to tidal influence but also all wa-
ters that served or could serve as commercial highways.92 
B. Restraining Privatization of Public Trust Resources 
A second fundamental antimonopoly characteristic of the American PTD 
at the turn of the twentieth century was a restriction on privatizing trust re-
sources. This restraint on alienation was the product of the United States Su-
preme Court’s 1892 opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, in which 
the Court invalidated a legislative attempt to privatize most of Chicago Har-
bor, hinging its decision on the PTD.93 Four years later, in 1896, the Court 
upheld a state’s right to restrict privatization of wildlife in Geer v. Connecti-
cut, concluding that wild animals were part of the public trust.94 
                                                                                                                           
 88 The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 457. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine—A Twenty-First Century Concept, 16 
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 105–06 (2010) (“[T]he English standard of navi-
gability did not fit the American continent, with its great rivers and lakes. Thus, over a century-
and-a-half ago, navigability—central to the historic public trust doctrine, evolved from a coastal to 
an inland, upriver concept.”); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative 
Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196 (1980) (“The open-
ing of the Northwest Territory and the purchase of Louisiana presented us with vastly different 
waters than the seas and rivers of England. Unrestricted use of the inland waterways was a neces-
sity for the development of the country.”). 
 91 94 U.S. at 338; see also Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 161 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“Although watercourse sovereignty ran with the tidewaters in England, an 
island country, in America the doctrine was extended to navigable inland watercourses as well.” 
(citing Barney, 94 U.S. at 324)). 
 92 Public rights in navigable-in-fact waters became so well accepted during the twentieth 
century that later there was some question about whether the navigable-in-fact test had eclipsed 
the tidal waters test. In 1988, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court clarified 
that tidal waters that were not subject to navigation were in fact public trust waters. 484 U.S. at 
478. 
 93 146 U.S. 387, 458, 464 (1892). 
 94 161 U.S. at 529, 535. 
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1. Restraining Privatization of Water Resources 
The landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad involved a dispute aris-
ing from an attempt by the Illinois legislature to privatize most of Chicago 
Harbor.95 In 1869, the Illinois legislature enacted the Lake Front Act, which 
granted Illinois Central Railroad roughly one thousand acres of Lake Mich-
igan’s submerged lands.96 Four years later, amid widespread allegations of 
corruption, the legislature revoked the grant.97 The railroad objected to the 
revocation, maintaining that the conveyance had transferred vested property 
rights that were not subject to legislative revocation without compensa-
tion.98  
The Court upheld the legislature’s 1873 revocation of the grant in a 
majority opinion by Justice Stephen J. Field who decided that the PTD 
made the state’s submerged lands largely inalienable.99 In a decision that 
Professor Joe Sax characterized as the “lodestar” of the PTD, Justice Field 
stated, “A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a state has 
never been adjudged to be within the state’s legislative power; and any at-
tempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, 
as subject to revocation.”100 The state can no more abdicate its trust over 
property in which the whole people are interested—like navigable waters 
and the soils underneath them—than it can abdicate its police power in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.101 Conse-
                                                                                                                           
 95 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458, 464. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15 
(claiming that the 1869 grant was not simply a scandalous legislative grant but was the product of 
four decades of political wrangling between the city of Chicago, the state of Illinois, and business-
es like the railroad and suggesting that downstate economic interests favored the grant because the 
1869 legislation entitled them to share in fees paid by the railroad). 
 96  Lake Front Act, 1869.11, Laws 245 (repealed by Act of April 15, 1873, 1873.11, Laws 
115); Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 454. 
 97 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 463. 
 98 Id. at 433–34. 
 99 See id. at 458, 464. The decision was unclear as to whether the grant to the railroad was 
voidable by the legislature or void at the outset, but the ambiguity did not affect the outcome, 
since the Illinois legislature had revoked its grant. See id. Subsequent decisions, however, indicate 
that such a grant is void, at least in Illinois. See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (enjoining a conveyance to Loyola University of 
eighteen acres of submerged Lake Michigan lands); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 
N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976) (striking down a conveyance of 194 submerged acres of Lake Michigan to 
U.S. Steel). 
 100 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453; Sax, supra note 2, at 489. Similarly, Professor Charles 
Wilkinson called Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, “the leading case on the traditional public 
trust doctrine.” Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 450; see Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 101 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. The size of the grant concerned the Court, with Justice 
Field remarking that it was “as large as that embraced by the merchandise docks along the Thames 
at London; is much larger than that included in the famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is twice 
the size of the port at Marseilles, and nearly, if not quite, equal to the pier area along the water 
front at New York.” Id. at 454. 
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quently, the Court held that “[t]here can be no irrepealable contract of prop-
erty by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to 
hold and manage it.”102 
Although the Court concluded that the grant of most of Chicago Har-
bor violated the PTD, the Illinois Central opinion did not prohibit all aliena-
tion of public trust resources. The Court suggested two circumstances under 
which the public’s right to use navigable water could be extinguished: a 
sovereign may alienate a public trust resource: where doing so (1) furthered 
the purposes of the public trust,103 or (2) did not substantially impair public 
use of the remaining public trust resources.104 As a result, states retain some 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 460. Justice Field did not discuss the origins of Illinois’ fiduciary obligations con-
cerning certain public resources. See id. Arguably, the Court’s conclusion and assertions about the 
public trust were based on federal common law recognition of a doctrine the United States inherit-
ed from England. See id.; Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal 
Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 130 
(2010) (so arguing). But see William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive 
Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 700 (2012) (Criticizing as “notoriously murky . . . the founda-
tions of the rule that prevented Illinois from conveying a large part of the Chicago lakefront to a 
railroad corporation. That decision has been described as resting on state common law, federal 
common law, the federal navigational servitude, and an inchoate concept of inalienable sovereign-
ty.”). In the more than one hundred years since Illinois Central, the Court has not clarified wheth-
er the public trust doctrine originates in state or federal law, although it has proclaimed in dicta 
that the decision in that case was “necessarily a statement of Illinois law.” Appleby v. City of 
N.Y., 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926); see Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 459; see also Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 484 U.S. at 475 (states may “define the limits of lands they hold in public trust and recognize 
private rights in such lands as they see fit.”). In 2012, in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, the Su-
preme Court explained: 
Pursuant to [the equal footing] doctrine, upon its date of statehood, a State gains title 
within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable. It may allocate and govern 
those lands according to state law subject only to the United States’ power “to con-
trol such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.” 
132 S. Ct. 1215, 1219 (2012) (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 1 (1935)). 
 103 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452. The Court explained: 
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over 
them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and 
piers therein, for which purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; 
and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be 
made to the grants. 
Id. 
 104 Id. The Court also announced: 
It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters that may afford foundation for 
wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels 
which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands 
and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cas-
es as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public 
upon which such lands are held by the state. 
Id. 
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discretion in managing their trust resources, although many impose a pre-
sumption against alienation of public resources, requiring clear legislative 
intent to accomplish such alienation.105 As the United States Supreme Court 
stated, “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be 
lost.”106 Thus, before the turn of the twentieth century, American public trust 
case law established a preference for public ownership and control of key 
natural resources and an aversion to private monopolies. 
2. Restraining Privatization of Wildlife 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the PTD had evolved to restrict 
privatization of resources beyond navigable waters. For example, in addi-
tion to protecting public access to waterways, both Arnold and Waddell’s 
Lessee preserved public rights to harvest oysters on commonly owned sub-
merged lands.107 Then, four years after its decision in Illinois Central Rail-
road, the United States Supreme Court ratified state claims of sovereign 
ownership of all wildlife as part of the public trust.108 
In 1896, in Geer v. Connecticut, the Court ratified state claims of sov-
ereign ownership of all wildlife, which the Court recognized as part of the 
public trust.109 Accordingly, the Court upheld Connecticut’s right to restrict 
privatization of wild animals.110 The state charged Edward Geer with violat-
ing a state law that criminalized the transport of certain bird species across 
state lines.111 Although Geer’s possession of the birds was legal, because he 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See, e.g., Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 343 (Fla. 1986) 
(explaining that state sovereignty lands “cannot be conveyed without clear intent and authority”); 
Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 686 (N.C. 1995) (stating that “the presumption arising under 
the public trust doctrine that the General Assembly did not convey title free of public trust rights 
has not been rebutted and prevails in this case”); Cmty. Nat’l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195, 1198 
(Vt. 2001) (rejecting alienation where “the record contains no clear expression of a legislative 
intent to abandon the public trust interest in the land in question”). 
 106 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 107 See Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 418; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76–77; see supra notes 43–78 
and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
 108 See Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (stating that states’ sovereign ownership of wildlife “is to be 
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a 
prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of 
private individuals as distinguished from the public good”); Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 459 (stat-
ing that “soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in trust for the common 
use”). See generally Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1466 (discussing the public trust in wild-
life and providing a compendium of state wildlife trusts). 
 109 See Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (stating that states’ sovereign ownership of wildlife “is to be 
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a 
prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of 
private individuals as distinguished from the public good”). 
 110 See id. at 519, 529. 
 111 Id. at 521. 
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had shot them during hunting season, the statute prohibited their out-of-
state transport.112 The state successfully prosecuted Geer in the lower 
courts, and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that 
Connecticut’s law violated the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause.113 
The Court rejected Geer’s argument and affirmed the state conviction 
in an opinion by Justice Edward White, who recounted “numerous” exam-
ples of judicial recognition of the states’ right to regulate wild animals,114 
explaining that “the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to possession has 
[long] been subject to the control of the law-giving power.”115 As with lands 
under navigable and tidal waters, Geer traced the state’s ownership of wild 
animals to rights transferred from the King of England, and consequently 
clarified that wild animals are a public trust resource.116 
Like navigable waters, states own wildlife in their sovereign capacity, 
in trust for the people. At the turn of the twentieth century, Geer expanded 
the PTD beyond the limits of navigable waters, recognizing wildlife as a 
trust resource.117 Thus states may restrict privatization of wild animals, in-
cluding preventing wildlife harvests or transportation. Like Illinois Central 
Railroad, Geer was fundamentally an antimonopoly decision.118 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: EXPANDING  
ANTIMONOPOLY PROTECTION 
Like the common law from which it emerged, the public trust doctrine 
(“PTD”) continued to evolve in the twentieth century, changing in response 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Id. at 521–22. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. at 528. 
 115 Id. 522. 
 116 Id. at 527, 529. Justice White stated:  
[T]he power or control lodged in the state, resulting from . . . common ownership, is 
to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the 
people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from 
the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public 
good. 
Id. Justice White also decided that transactions occurring within Connecticut’s borders were not 
interstate commerce under the U.S. Constitution because he concluded that items entering the food 
supply could be the object of commerce only with the state’s consent. Id. at 534–35. The Supreme 
Court reversed part of the opinion in 1979 in Hughes v. Oklahoma. 441 U.S. 322, 335, 338 (1979) 
(ruling that Oklahoma could not ban exports of native minnows because wildlife was commerce, 
subject to the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause). 
 117 See 161 U.S. at 529 (“the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from . . . common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the 
people”). 
 118 See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text (discussing antimonopoly in Illinois Cen-
tral). 
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to public values, needs, and uses of natural resources.119 As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court explained in 1972, “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all 
common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should 
be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the pub-
lic it was created to benefit.”120   
Over the last two centuries, the PTD has grown in several somewhat 
surprising ways, extending antimonopoly protection beyond tidelands and 
beyond traditional public uses while reinforcing the principle of non-
alienation of natural resources. First, the PTD has expanded to protect uses 
beyond the traditional triad of commerce, navigation, and fishing. Some 
states now recognize recreation and ecological use as trust purposes, trans-
forming the doctrine into a vehicle to, for example, protect wetlands and 
preserve lake and river waters in place.121 Second, courts have recognized 
additional trust resources, including non-navigable waters and upland re-
sources like parks.122 Third, state courts have continued to recognize re-
straints on privatization of public trust resources.123 Fourth, by the turn of 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“The public uses to which 
tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administer-
ing the [PTD] the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of 
utilization over another.”) (internal citation omitted). See generally Michael C. Blumm, Public 
Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 579 (1989) (asserting that the public trust doctrine is “chameleon-
like” because courts apply it to create a variety of different types of remedies); Bertram C. Frey & 
Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surfaceways and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 
40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 907, 911–12 (2007) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is an “inher-
ently dynamic” and evolving aspect of the common law). 
 120 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) 
(ensuring public access to dry sandy portions of a municipal beach). 
 121 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 719, 728 
(Cal. 1983) (acknowledging that the “principal values” the plaintiffs sought to protect were “rec-
reational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the 
use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds,” and concluding that “protection of these values is 
among the purposes of the public trust”); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 
(Cal. 1980) (noting early disputes concerning public interest in tidelands “encompass[ed] naviga-
tion, commerce and fishing, the permissible range of public uses is far broader, including the right 
to hunt, bathe or swim, and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state as ecological 
units for scientific study”); Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to 
include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the 
navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, stand-
ing, or other purposes.”). 
 122 See Pullen v. Ullmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60–61 (Alaska 1996) (concluding that the PTD applies 
to salmon and other fish); In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 
409, 453, 488 (Haw. 2000) (deciding that groundwater is a public trust resource); Gould v. Grey-
lock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966) (holding that privatization of a 
substantial part of a public park violated the state’s public trust doctrine). 
 123 See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 443–45 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (relying on the PTD to prevent a state’s grant of 18.5 acres of lakebed for devel-
opment of an athletic facility); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 
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the twenty-first century, a number of PTD decisions reflected efforts to pro-
tect trust resources from environmental degradation.124 As with early public 
trust case law, these developments seek to prevent private monopolization 
of important natural resources. 
A. Protecting Public Resource Uses Beyond Commerce,  
Navigation, and Fishing 
The PTD traditionally supplied antimonopoly protection for activities 
in commerce, navigation, and fishing.125 As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
explained, “[t]he original purpose of the doctrine was to preserve for the use 
of all the public natural water resources for navigation and commerce, wa-
terways being the principal transportation arteries of early days, and for 
fishing, an important source of food.”126 In recent decades, state courts have 
expanded the scope of activities covered by the PTD beyond that triad to 
protect public recreation and ecological preservation under the doctrine, 
expanding its antimonopoly effect.127 
                                                                                                                           
166–73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the Arizona legislature’s grant of riverbed lands to a pri-
vate owner on PTD grounds); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 780–81 (Ill. 
1976) (relying on Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), to prevent conveyance 
of submerged lands). 
 124 See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Inte-
grating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 708 (2006). According to Professor Klass: 
These more recent public trust decisions show how the environmental movement of 
the 1970s began to influence state courts’ conceptions of the role of the common 
law public trust doctrine in our modern world. Indeed, the supreme courts of Cali-
fornia, Wisconsin and Illinois and lower courts in other jurisdictions issued strong 
public trust opinions in the 1970s that expressly recognized society’s growing con-
cern regarding environmental issues and the need . . . . 
Id.; see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doc-
trines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward and Ecological Public Trust, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 80–91 (2010) (discussing the emergence of ecologically related PTDs in west-
ern states). 
 125 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements are traditionally defined in terms of 
navigation, commerce and fisheries.”). 
 126 Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 52. 
 127 Id. at 54 (“We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century, 
the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, 
but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”); 
see infra notes 128–188 and accompanying text (discussing this expansion to recreation and eco-
logical function). 
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1. Recreation 
A number of states have extended PTD antimonopoly protection to 
recreational uses of natural resources.128 In 1893, Minnesota became the 
first state to embrace recreation as a public trust purpose.129 In Lamprey v. 
Metcalf, private parties claimed that they owned the bed of a dry lake, hav-
ing acquired it under federal patents, and that because the lakes were not 
used for navigable commerce, they were not subject to public rights.130 The 
state of Minnesota objected, maintaining that it owned the former lakebed 
in its sovereign capacity, and that private ownership extended only to the 
uplands above the lake’s original borders.131 The trial court found for the 
private parties, and the state appealed.132 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the landown-
ers owned the dry lakebeds, but it also decided that lakebeds were subject to 
the public trust if they were suitable for recreation, not just navigable com-
merce.133 According to the court, thousands of other lakes in the state also 
had receding lake levels and might also become dry.134 Many of the lakes 
had not been used for commercial navigation, but they supported various 
public recreational uses, including boating and bathing.135 Although ac-
knowledging that private parties acquired ownership of the lakebed,136 the 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965(14) (2016) (defining “navigable waters” to include 
waters that may be used for “floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, 
trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes”); 
State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (deciding that a watercourse can be considered 
navigable due solely to recreational use); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 448 (stat-
ing that “the trust traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing” but 
also recognizing “a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating, and 
scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes”); Kootenai Envt’l Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht 
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092–93 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust 
purpose); J.P. Furlong Enter., Inc. v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) 
(extending public trust protection to bathing, swimming, fishing, and irrigation); Morse v. Or. Div. 
of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 1978) (stating that public trust protection extends to 
recreation); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987) (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 
462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969)) (public trust rights include navigation, fishing, swimming, water 
skiing, and other related recreational purposes); Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 
1972) (“The active public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin in respect to navigable waters re-
quires the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve those waters for 
fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.”); Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296 
(Wis. 1971) (purposes of trust “include all public uses of water”); see also Wilkinson, supra note 
23, at 465 (discussing extension of the public trust beyond the traditional triad of uses). 
 129 Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143–44 (Minn. 1893). 
 130 Id. at 1140. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 1144.  
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 1143. 
 136 Id. at 1144. The Lamprey court explained:  
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court agreed with the state that waters were subject to the public trust, even 
if they were used only for recreation.137 As the court explained: 
Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of this state, are not 
adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent 
for, commercial navigation; but they are used—and as population 
increases, and towns and cities are built up in their vicinity, will 
be still more used-by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowl-
ing, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and 
even city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which 
cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all 
these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of 
navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, 
the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.138 
Lamprey thus extended public rights to all waters suited for public recrea-
tion.139 
 Many other state courts have since extended the PTD’s antimonopoly 
protection to waters used for recreation.140 Montana offers a good example. 
In 1984, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision prohibiting a private 
landowner and his oil company from excluding the public from recreating 
on some seven miles of the Dearborn River.141 The trial court held that the 
public had a right to use the waters and streambed of the river up to the high 
water mark, because the river was navigable-in-fact at the time of statehood 
                                                                                                                           
[S]o long as these lakes are capable of use for boating, even for pleasure, they are 
navigable, within the reason and spirit of the common-law rule. When the waters of 
any of them have so far receded or dried upon to be no longer capable of any benefi-
cial use by the public, they are no longer public waters, and their former beds, under 
the principles already announced, would become the private property of the riparian 
owners. 
Id. 
 137 Id. at 1143. 
 138 Id. (emphasis added). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to include 
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the naviga-
ble waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or 
other purposes.”); Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54 (recognizing public recreational rights 
to beaches and the water they abut); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Or. 1936) (ac-
knowledging the public right to recreational use of waters); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 
437, 442 (Or. 1918) (recognizing public rights in “sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skat-
ing . . . and other public uses which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated” (quoting 
Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143)). 
 141 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 169–70 (Mont. 1984). 
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the state owned the streambeds.142 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, 
agreeing that the Dearborn River was navigable under federal law.143 But 
the court also indicated that the PTD extended beyond waters in which the 
state owned the bed, adopting a recreational-use test like that first an-
nounced by the Minnesota court in Lamprey: 
The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes deter-
mines their availability for recreational use by the public. Stream-
bed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If the waters are 
owned by the State and held in trust for the people by the State, no 
private party may bar the use of those waters by the people.144 
Interpreting the state constitution to codify the PTD, the court concluded 
that the private landowner could not exclude the public from recreational 
use of the river.145 
One month later, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hil-
dreth, the Montana Supreme Court confirmed its extension of the PTD to 
recreational uses.146 A citizen group filed suit against a private owner, Low-
ell Hildreth, who had attempted to exclude members of the public from 
floating on a stream that ran through his property.147 The trial court enjoined 
Hildreth from interfering with floaters, deciding that the stream was suitable 
for recreation, and therefore subject to Montana’s public trust.148 Hildreth 
appealed, but the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the capa-
bility of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines whether the 
waters can be so used,”149 and concluding that because the stream was suit-
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. at 172. The district court also dismissed Curran’s counterclaim for inverse condemna-
tion. Id. at 171. 
 143 Id. at 172 
 144 Id. at 170; see also Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (discussing cases 
from several other states and joining those concluding that public recreational rights were inde-
pendent of private ownership of the bed of the body of water). On the pleasure-boat test for navi-
gability, see DUNNING, supra note 30, § 32.03. 
 145 Curran, 682 P.2d at 170–71 (quoting the Montana Constitution as providing that “[a]l 
surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the 
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as 
provided by law”). 
 146 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984). 
 147 Id. at 1090. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 1091. Curiously, the court was reluctant to adopt the so-called “pleasure-boat test,” 
used in other jurisdictions. Id.; see DUNNING, supra note 30, § 32.03. Instead, the court held that a 
body of water is subject to the state’s PTD if it is suitable for recreation. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 
1091. In its holding, the Montana Supreme Court explained:  
The [trial court] found the Beaverhead River to be navigable for recreational use un-
der the pleasure-boat test and the commercial use test. While we affirm the result, 
we find it unnecessary and improper to determine a specific test under which to find 
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able for recreation, the public not only could float on the stream but also 
had portage rights to cross Hildreth’s land to navigate around barriers in the 
water.150 
Like early public trust cases, the Curran and Hildreth decisions reject-
ed landowner monopolization of PTD water resources, preserving them for 
public recreational use.151 
2. Ecological Preservation 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the PTD has evolved to 
preserve ecosystems and other uses of trust resources, including non-
consumptive purposes such as wildlife viewing, scientific study, and con-
servation for future generations.152 In the 1970s and 1980s, California 
courts embraced an expanded interpretation of PTD purposes that included 
ecological preservation,153 and other state courts have reached the same 
                                                                                                                           
navigability for recreational use. The pleasure-boat test is a test which has not been 
adopted in Montana and the commercial use test is a federal test designed to deter-
mine navigability for title purposes and not navigability for use. Neither are suitable 
nor appropriate here. . . . We have not limited the recreational use of the State’s wa-
ters by devising a specific test. As we held in Curran, the capability of use of the 
waters for recreational purposes determines whether the waters can be so used. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 150 Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091, 1094. The portage rights recognized by the Montana Supreme 
Court are limited to those with the least intrusive effects on private property. Id. The court subse-
quently clarified that the state could not require private landowners to assume the cost of main-
taining portage routes. Galt v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 916 
(Mont. 1987). The Montana Supreme Court stated:  
[A]lthough the recreational user has a right to portage around obstructions minimal-
ly impacting the adjoining landowner’s fee interest, there can be no responsibility on 
behalf of the landowner to pay for such portage route. The landowner receives no 
benefit from the portage. The benefit flows to the public and the expense should be 
borne by the State. 
Id. 
 151 Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091; Curran, 682 P.2d at 171. 
 152 See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719 (acknowledging that the “principal values” the 
plaintiffs sought to protect were “recreational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its 
shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds,” and conclud-
ing that “protection of these values is among the purposes of the public trust”); City of Berkeley, 
606 P.2d at 365 (noting “the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state as ecological units 
for scientific study”); Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to in-
clude the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the 
navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, stand-
ing, or other purposes.”). 
 153 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 365; Marks, 491 P.2d at 
380. 
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conclusion.154 In thus expanding PTD purposes, courts have recognized the 
interconnectedness of natural resources, as well as the fact that private mo-
nopolization of one resource, like water, can have cascading effects on other 
public resources, such as wildlife and recreation. 
In 1971, in Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court rejected a 
private landowner’s attempt to develop—and therefore monopolize—
tidelands on the Pacific Ocean.155 Larry Marks had acquired title to tide-
lands abutting the shoreline of Peter Whitney’s upland property under an 
1874 state patent.156 Marks had record title to the tidelands, and thus 
claimed he could fill them for development.157 Whitney, his neighbor, ob-
jected, maintaining that Marks’ tideland development plans would unlaw-
fully eviscerate his rights both as a littoral owner and as a member of the 
public to access the tidelands and the navigable waters covering them.158 
The trial court settled the common boundary line but enjoined Whitney 
from using the tidelands as a member of the public.159 Whitney appealed.160 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982) (upholding a public inter-
est in “preservation” of state waters); Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 76 n.20 (Haw. 
1982) (extending PTD protection to “a free-flowing stream for its own sake”); In re Dravo Basic 
Materials Co., 604 So. 2d 630, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“A public trust for the protection, conser-
vation, and replenishment of the environment, including the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthet-
ics quality of the environment is mandated by the Louisiana Constitution.”); Bayview Land, Ltd. 
v. State ex rel. Clark, 950 So. 2d 966, 979 (Miss. 2006) (“This Court has held the many public 
purposes of the trust to include ‘navigation and transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swim-
ming, and other recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental protec-
tion and preservation, the enhancement of aquatic, avarian and marine life, sea agriculture and no 
doubt others.’” (quoting Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986))); 
Mineral Cty. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (“Although the 
original objectives of the public trust were to protect the public’s rights in navigation, commerce, 
and fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass additional public values—including recreational 
and ecological uses.”); Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 838 (“[W]e find the public trust doctrine manifested 
in . . . South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act, authorizing legal action to protect ‘the air, 
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or de-
struction.’”); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 
1993) (“The ‘public trust’ doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their 
public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.”); Orion Corp., 747 P.2d at 1083 
(“The record persuasively establishes that Padilla Bay is subject to the public trust rights and that 
the public has an intense interest in prohibiting tideland uses that would endanger the ecological 
environment . . . .”); see also Craig, supra note 124, at 80–91. 
 155 Marks, 491 P.2d at 378, 381. 
 156 Id. at 377. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. The court explained that “[t]idelands are properly those lands lying between the lines of 
mean high and low tide covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow thereof. The trial court found 
that the portion of Marks’ lands here under consideration constitutes a part of the tidelands of 
Tomales Bay. . . .” Id. at 378–79 (internal citations omitted). 
 159 Id. at 377–78, 381. 
 160 Id. at 378.  
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The Supreme Court of California acknowledged Marks’ title to the 
tidelands but made clear that California’s conveyance creating private own-
ership did not extinguish the public trust.161 Consequently, Marks’ private 
ownership could not divest the public—including Whitney—of access 
rights to tidelands held in trust.162 
The Marks court explained that preventing landowner monopolization 
of tidelands was a “matter of great public importance, particularly in view 
of population pressures, demands for recreational property, and the increas-
ing development of seashore and waterfront property.”163 In support of pub-
lic access, the court clarified that California’s PTD-protected uses of trust 
resources extended beyond the traditional triad of commerce, navigation, 
and fishing.164 Accordingly, public trust uses are not static, but rather are 
flexible and can accommodate evolving public needs.165 Presciently, the 
court stated that the PTD extended to recreation and conservation: 
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most im-
portant public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Id. at 379. The court explained: 
California acquired title to the navigable waterways and tidelands by virtue of her 
sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 1850. This title is different in character 
from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. The state holds tidelands 
in trust for public purposes, traditionally delineated in terms of navigation, com-
merce and fisheries.  
Id. at 379 n.5 (internal citations omitted). Further noting:  
the public right was not intended to be divested or affected by a sale of tide lands 
under these general laws relating alike both to swamp land and tidelands. Our opin-
ion is that . . . the buyer of land under these statutes receives the title to the soil, the 
jus privatum, subject to the public right of navigation, and in subordination to the 
right of the state to take possession and use and improve it for that purpose, as it 
may deem necessary. 
Id. at 379. 
 162 Id. at 381 (“There is absolutely no merit in Marks’ contention that as the owner of the Jus 
privatum under this patent he may fill and develop his property, whether for navigational purposes 
or not . . . .”). 
 163 Id. at 378. 
 164 See id. at 380. 
 165 Id. (“The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass 
changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded clas-
sification favoring one mode of utilization over another.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Ill. 
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892) (“[The governing of the public trust] must vary 
with varying circumstances. The legislation which may be needed one day for the [waterway in 
question] may be different from the legislation that may be required at another day.”); In re Water 
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (“The public trust, by its very nature, does not remain 
fixed for all time, but must conform to changing needs and circumstances.”); Borough of Neptune 
City, 294 A.2d at 54 (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and 
needs of the public it was created to benefit.”). 
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the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their nat-
ural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific 
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect 
the scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here de-
fine precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands.166 
Marks thus began the trend toward public trust protection for resources 
of ecological value.167 
Another California public trust case, National Audubon Society v. Supe-
rior Court (Mono Lake), reinforced the idea that the PTD protects ecological 
conservation and other public uses beyond commerce, navigation, and fish-
ing.168 Environmentalists challenged a 1940 state grant of a water right to 
divert water from streams feeding Mono Lake to the Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power (“DWP”) for municipal water, alleging violations of sev-
eral state statutes and the PTD.169 The state and the DWP defended on the 
ground that municipal use of was the highest use of water under state water 
law.170 Although the state knew of the likely damage to Mono Lake when it 
granted the water right in 1940, the water agency assumed that it had no au-
thority to prevent damage caused by the diversions.171 By 1979, the diver-
sions had a drastic effect on Mono Lake, shrinking the lake by 85 square 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
 167 See id. 
 168 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, 
Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (dis-
cussing the legacy of this case); Sherry A. Enzler, How Law Mattered to the Mono Lake Ecosys-
tem, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 413 (2011) (explaining how this case helped 
preserve the larger Mono Lake ecosystem); Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water 
Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 
ENVTL. L. 561 (2015) (providing a detailed background on this case from someone who lived 
nearby). 
 169 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712. 
 170 Id. at 714 n.6. 
 171 Id. The court cited the Water Board’s reasoning in the following terms: 
The Board’s decision states that “[i]t is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed 
development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but 
there is apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it. The use to which the 
City proposes to put the water under its Applications . . . is defined by the Water 
Commission Act as the highest to which water may be applied and to make availa-
ble unappropriated water for this use the City has, by the condemnation proceedings 
described above, acquired the littoral and riparian rights on Mono Lake and its tribu-
taries south of Mill Creek. This office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all 
protests based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake and the 
effect that the diversion of water from these streams may have upon the aesthetic 
and recreational value of the Basin.” 
Id. 
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miles to just 60 square miles, with further declines imminent.172 Shrimp 
populations in the lake, upon which millions of local and migratory birds re-
lied, declined significantly.173 Human uses of Mono Lake like boating, fish-
ing, and wildlife viewing were also adversely affected.174 
When they did not obtain relief in the lower courts, the environmental-
ists appealed.175 In 1983, the California Supreme Court ruled that a state 
agency’s failure to consider the detrimental environmental effects on a 
lake’s ecosystem of the diversions violated the PTD.176 The court recog-
nized that the “principal values” the environmentalists sought to protect 
were “recreational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Id. The Water Board anticipated diminishment to thirty-eight square miles or fewer—
which would have been less than half the size of the pre-diversion lake. Id. at 715. 
 173 Id. The California Supreme Court explained:  
Plaintiffs predict that the lake’s steadily increasing salinity, if unchecked, will wreak 
havoc throughout the local food chain. They contend that the lake’s algae, and the 
brine shrimp and brine flies that feed on it, cannot survive the projected salinity in-
crease . . . . DWP’s diversions also present several threats to the millions of local 
and migratory birds using the lake. First, since many species of birds feed on the 
lake’s brine shrimp, any reduction in shrimp population allegedly caused by rising 
salinity endangers a major avian food source. The Task Force Report considered it 
“unlikely that any of Mono Lake’s major bird species . . . will persist at the lake if 
populations of invertebrates disappear.” Second, the increasing salinity makes it 
more difficult for the birds to maintain osmotic equilibrium with their environment. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 174 See id. at 716. The court stated: 
[T]he lake’s recession obviously diminishes its value as an economic, recreational, 
and scenic resource. Of course, there will be less lake to use and enjoy. The declin-
ing shrimp hatch depresses a local shrimping industry. The rings of dry lake bed are 
difficult to traverse on foot, and thus impair human access to the lake, and reduce 
the lake’s substantial scenic value. Mono Lake has long been treasured as a unique 
scenic, recreational and scientific resource, but continued diversions threaten to turn 
it into a desert wasteland like the dry bed of Owens Lake. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 175 Id. at 717. 
 176 Id. at 712 (explaining “we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water 
diversions they should consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the public 
trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests”). The court 
began its opinion by describing the ecological importance of Mono Lake: 
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the Sierra Neva-
da escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. The lake is sa-
line; it contains no fish but supports a large population of brine shrimp which feed 
vast numbers of nesting and migratory birds. Islands in the lake protect a large 
breeding colony of California gulls, and the lake itself serves as a haven on the mi-
gration route for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson’s Phalarope, and Eared 
Grebe. Towers and spires of tufa on the north and south shores are matters of geo-
logical interest and a tourist attraction. 
Id. at 711. 
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shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by 
birds.”177 Concluding that “protection of these values is among the purposes 
of the public trust,”178 the court agreed that the PTD required the state to 
evaluate the ecological effects of water diversion adversely affecting trust 
uses.179 As the court explained, the state had an ongoing duty to supervise 
navigable waters and the lands beneath them, and thus could not grant water 
rights that unnecessarily harm trust resources.180 Further, the court ruled that 
PTD prevents anyone from obtaining a vested water right to a diversion 
harming public trust uses.181 The decision effectively renounced monopoli-
zation of water that impaired public use and enjoyment of a PTD re-
source.182 
Other state courts have also acknowledged ecological conservation as 
a public trust purpose. For example, in 1982, the Supreme Court of the State 
of Hawaii recognized public trust protection for the preservation of its state 
waters,183 answering questions about the state’s PTD that were certified to it 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was con-
sidering the state’s decision about water rights allocation in the Hanapepe 
River system.184 The court instructed that state law required private land-
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id. at 719. 
 178 Id.  
 179 Id. at 732. In doing so, however, the court clarified that it did not “dictate any particular 
allocation of water.” Id. Rather, the court stated: 
As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations de-
spite foreseeable harm to the public trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must 
bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public 
trust, and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected 
by the trust. 
Id. at 728 (internal citation omitted). 
 180 Id. at 727. The Mono Lake court explained: 
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable wa-
ters and the lands beneath those waters. This principle, fundamental to the concept 
of the public trust, applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands 
and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate 
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust. 
Id. 
 181 Id. at 712. 
 182 See id. at 712, 727. It remains somewhat of a puzzle as to why the Mono Lake decision has 
not played a more prominent role in California water law, having little apparent effect on ensuing 
case law. See id. at 712; Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the 
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1114, 1139 (2012) (finding that the primary 
effect of the case has been on the State Water Resources Control Board decisions). If the water 
board has institutionalized PTD consideration into its decision-making, though, the Mono Lake 
case has in fact significantly altered California water law. Owen, supra at 1139; see Mono Lake, 
658 P.2d at 712. 
 183 Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310–11. 
 184 Id. at 292; see McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1343 (Haw. 1973). 
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owners to leave additional water in the river, because their diversions 
caused the river to nearly run dry during part of the year, violating the 
PTD.185 Describing the state’s public trust, the court explained that the PTD 
extended to the preservation of water resources, imposing on the state “a 
concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future 
generations.”186 
Like the California courts, the Hawaii Supreme Court thus extended 
PTD antimonopoly protection to public uses beyond commerce, navigation, 
and fishing to ecological conservation.187 Other state courts have agreed.188 
B. Expanding Public Trust Resources 
In recent decades, states have expanded the PTD’s antimonopoly im-
pulse to include an increasing number of natural resources,189 extending 
public rights beyond waterways and protecting both public access and the 
resources themselves. Thus far, beyond navigable and tidal waters, courts 
have embraced all of the following under the public trust: (1) wildlife,190 (2) 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310; see McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1334, 1346. 
 186 Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310. 
 187 See generally Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to 
Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749, 
761 (1992) (“The marriage of absolute ecological protection with absolute access for the purpose 
of utilizing natural resources comes the closest to the true essence of the public trust doctrine.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311 (upholding a public interest in “preservation” of state 
waters); Reppun, 656 P.2d at 76 n.20 (extending PTD protection to “a free-flowing stream for its 
own sake”); In re Dravo Basic Materials Co., 604 So. 2d at 635 (“A public trust for the protection, 
conservation, and replenishment of the environment, including the healthful, scenic, historic, and 
esthetics quality of the environment is mandated by the Louisiana Constitution.”); Bayview Land, 
Ltd., 950 So. 2d at 979 (“This Court has held the many public purposes of the trust to include 
navigation and transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming, and other recreational ac-
tivities, development of mineral resources, environmental protection and preservation, the en-
hancement of aquatic, avarian and marine life, sea agriculture and no doubt others.”); Mineral 
Cnty., 20 P.3d at 807 (“Although the original objectives of the public trust were to protect the 
public’s rights in navigation, commerce, and fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass additional 
public values—including recreational and ecological uses.”); Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 838 (“[W]e 
find the public trust doctrine manifested in . . . South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act, 
authorizing legal action to protect ‘the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust 
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.’” (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1 
(2004)); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 869 P.2d at 919 (“The ‘public trust’ doctrine . . . pro-
tects the ecological integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the 
public at large.”); Orion Corp., 747 P.2d at 1083 (“The record persuasively establishes that Padilla 
Bay is subject to the public trust rights and that the public has an intense interest in prohibiting 
tideland uses that would endanger the ecological environment . . . .”); see also Craig, supra note 
124, at 80–91 (discussing the emergence of ecologically related PTDs in western states). 
 189 See Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 107, 
116–21 (1986) (describing states’ extension of public trust protection to an increasing number of 
natural resources). 
 190 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). The United States Supreme Court, in 
1896, embraced wildlife as part of the PTD in Geer v. Connecticut, and nearly all states have fol-
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wildlife habitat connected to navigable waters,191 (3) marine life,192 (4) 
drinking water,193 (5) groundwater,194 (6) artificial waters,195 (7) inland wet-
lands,196 (8) state parks,197 (9) the dry sand area of beaches,198 and (10) ar-
chaeological remains.199 Discussing a few of those public trust extensions—
to non-navigable-in-fact waters, upland resources, and potentially the at-
mosphere—illustrates the doctrine’s evolution to protect additional natural 
resources from private monopolization. 
1. Non-Navigable-in-Fact Waters 
Some states have extended PTD antimonopoly protection to non-
navigable-in-fact waters, including drinking water,200 groundwater,201 sea-
                                                                                                                           
lowed suit. Id.; see Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1466 (asserting that at least forty-eight 
states have used public trust or trust-like language to describe their wildlife resources); see, e.g., 
Pullen, 923 P.2d at 61 (concluding that the PTD applies to salmon and other fish). In Horne v. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the United States Supreme Court ratified the sovereign ownership 
of wildlife doctrine. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015); see John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, 
Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign 
Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REV. 657, 688–97 (2016). 
 191 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (deciding that the public trust encompasses purposes broader 
than the traditional uses of navigation, commerce, and fishing, including use as open space, for 
wildlife study, for scientific study, and for swimming). 
 192 See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 673 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (applying the public trust doctrine to living marine resources). 
 193 See, e.g., Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1987) (stating that the public trust doctrine includes drinking water resources). 
 194 See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (ruling that groundwater is a 
public trust resource). 
 195 See, e.g., Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–25 (relying on public ownership of all state water to 
establish public access to three lakes created on private land by several unseasonably wet years). 
 196 See, e.g., Just, 201 N.W.2d at 769 (applying the public trust doctrine to inland wetlands). 
 197 See, e.g., Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126 (determining that privatization of a substantial part of 
a public park violated the state’s PTD); Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 750 N.E.2d 
1050, 1054–55 (N.Y. 2001) (finding a park to be within the state’s PTD); see also Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (extending public trust protection to a 
national park). 
 198 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984) (ex-
plaining that the public trust doctrine requires public access to the dry sand area of beaches be-
tween the high water mark and the vegetation line); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 
187, 197 (N.C. App. 2015) (discussed infra notes 227–231 and accompanying text). See generally 
Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above 
the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165 (2010) (discussing how 
the PTD can, and should, be used to protect upland areas, such as dry sand beaches and parks). 
 199 See, e.g., Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Ill. 1984) (finding archaeological 
remains to be within the state’s public trust). But see San Diego Cnty. Archaeological Soc’y, Inc. 
v. Compadres, 81 Cal.App.3d 923, 927 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the PTD does not apply to 
archaeological remains). 
 200 See Clifton, 539 A.2d at 765 (stating that the public trust doctrine includes drinking water 
resources). 
2017] The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine 33 
sonal waters,202 and inland wetlands.203 For example, extending the PTD to 
drinking water supplies, a New Jersey court invalidated a water commis-
sion’s distribution of funds to municipalities, holding that drinking water, 
along with any financial benefits it accrued, was a public trust resource.204 
According to the court: 
While the original purpose of the public trust doctrine was to pre-
serve the use of the public natural water for navigation, com-
merce and fishing, it is clear that since water is essential for hu-
man life, the doctrine applies with equal impact upon the control 
of our drinking water reserves . . . . Ultimate ownership rests in 
the people and this precious natural resource is held by the state 
in trust for the public benefit.205 
Consequently, the water commission could not charge rates in excess of its 
cost of water production and transfer the money it made to the municipali-
ties that owned the water.206 The court thus prevented financial monopoliza-
tion of the economic benefits through sale of a renewable public trust re-
source.207 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (extending the public trust doctrine 
to groundwater). 
 202 See Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–25 (relying on public ownership of all state water to sug-
gest that the public had access to three lakes created on private land by several unseasonably wet 
years). 
 203 See Just, 201 N.W.2d at 769 (finding that inland wetlands were part of the state’s public 
trust). 
 204 Clifton, 539 A.2d at 765, 767. 
 205 Id. at 765 (internal citations omitted). The court explained: 
Water is an essential commodity which all of nature requires for survival. Our food 
supply is derived through water which combines with nutrients and minerals to form 
the fruits and vegetables which become part of our daily diet. The plants of the soil, 
nurtured by water and consumed by animals, provide our main staple of meat. Like 
the plants and animals, we too must be nurtured by water . . . . Potable water, then, is 
an essential commodity which every individual requires in order to sustain human 
existence. 
Id at 765. 
 206 Id. at 767. 
 207 See id. In another case involving non-coastal waters, in 2004, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court decided that water in seasonal lakes was a public trust resource. Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–
25. After a series of unseasonably wet years caused water to accumulate in three large lakes, in 
Parks v. Cooper, the court ruled that the public could use those lakes for recreation, concluding 
that the water was a public trust resource and therefore not susceptible to private ownership, re-
jecting landowners’ arguments that the land hosting the seasonal lakes was private property. Id. 
Specifically, the court determined that the public lacked access rights on water over private lands: 
We conclude that all the water in South Dakota belongs to the people in accord with 
the public trust doctrine and as declared by statute and precedent, and thus, although 
the lake beds are mostly privately owned, the water in the lakes is public and may be 
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In 2000, in another case challenging agency allocation of water rights, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii decided that groundwater was a 
public trust resource.208 In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Wai-
ahole Ditch concerned Native Hawaiian residents challenged water exports 
in Waiahole Ditch from the windward side of Oahu to the leeward side of 
the island for agricultural irrigation.209 The natives argued that the ditch re-
duced the flow in several windward streams, harming wildlife and members 
of the public.210 Reviewing the state’s expansive constitutional public 
trust—which extends to “all public resources”—the court concluded that 
“the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or 
distinction,” including groundwater.211 The state’s public trust in groundwa-
ter required the state water agency to revise its decision to allocate water 
rights to private parties and preserve water for public use, thereby invoking 
the PTD to prevent monopolization of groundwater. 212 
In 2014, a California trial court also decided that groundwater pump-
ing adversely affected a navigable river and, in doing so, violated the 
                                                                                                                           
converted to public use, developed for public benefit, and appropriated, in accord 
with legislative direction and state regulation.  
Id. at 825. This result expanded the state’s public trust well beyond traditional navigable-in-fact 
waterways, preventing monopolization of seasonal lakes that were suitable for public recreation. 
Id. at 838–39 (“Today we acknowledge, in accord with the State’s sovereign powers and the legis-
lative mandate, that all the waters in South Dakota, not just those waters considered to be naviga-
ble under the federal test, are held in test for the public.”). 
 208 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447. 
 209 Id. at 422. 
 210 Id. at 422–23. The court reasoned: 
Diversions by the ditch system reduced the flows in several windward streams, spe-
cifically, Waiāhole, Waianu, Waikāne, and Kahana streams, affecting the natural 
environment and human communities dependent upon them. Diminished flows im-
paired native stream life and may have contributed to the decline in the greater 
Kāne’ohe Bay ecosystem, including the offshore fisheries. The impacts of stream 
diversion, however, went largely unacknowledged until, in the early 1990s, the sug-
ar industry on O’ahu came to a close. 
Id. 
 211 Id. at 445 (“The Hawai’i Constitution declares that ‘all public resources are held in trust by 
the state for the benefit of its people,’ . . . and establishes a public trust obligation ‘to protect, con-
trol, and regulate the use of Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people,’”). The court 
explained that “the common law distinctions between ground and surface water developed without 
regard to the manner in which ‘both categories represent no more than a single integrated source 
of water with each element dependent upon the other for its existence.’ . . . Modern science and 
technology have discredited the surface-ground dichotomy.” Id. at 447 (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting Reppun, 656 P.2d at 73). 
 212 See id. at 453, 501–02. 
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PTD.213 Environmentalists claimed that groundwater hydrologically con-
nected to the navigable Scott River was a public trust resource.214 They 
asked the court to enjoin a county from issuing well-drilling permits until it 
complied with the constraints imposed by the PTD.215 The Scott River, used 
for boating and fishing, among other purposes, is often dewatered in the 
summer and early fall, allegedly due to groundwater pumping. The envi-
ronmentalists claimed that the low water levels hindered recreational activi-
ties on Scott River and also harmed fish.216 The county regulating ground-
water pumping had not considered public trust implications before issuing 
the permits,217 and the court concluded that groundwater pumping would be 
subject to the PTD, if in fact it harmed the navigable Scott River.218 The 
result made clear that the state could not privatize groundwater to the detri-
ment of public use of the river. 
2. Beaches 
Courts have increasingly moved the PTD’s antimonopoly protection 
inland, including beaches.219 In 2005, for example, the Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, at *7, *10 
(Sup. Ct. Cal. July 15, 2014), http://www.envirolaw.org/documents/ScottOrderonCrossMotions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RNY2-FL6W]. 
 214 Id. at *8. 
 215 Id. at *2. The environmentalists sued both the State Water Resources Control Board (“the 
Board”) and the county. Id. They did not seek affirmative relief from the Board, but instead a 
judicial declaration that the PTD applies to groundwater hydrologically connected to a navigable 
river. Id. 
 216 Id. at *3–4 (“According to the Petitioners, at times almost every gallon of groundwater 
pumped decreases the flow of the Scott River by the same amount.”). 
 217 Id. at *4. The court in Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District, 
however, declined to declare that groundwater was a public trust resource because the California 
Court of Appeals earlier limited the California PTD’s scope to navigable surface waters. 209 Cal. 
App. 3d 1276, 1286 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Envtl. Law Found., No. 34-2010-80000583 at *8 
(“Petitioners request a declaration groundwater hydrologically connected to navigable surface 
flows is protected by the public trust doctrine. However, the court does not find groundwater itself 
is a resource protected by the public trust doctrine.”). 
 218 Envtl. Law Found., No. 34-2010-80000583 at *9–10 (citing Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721). 
As the court explained, California’s public trust applies to effects of groundwater pumping that 
damaged a navigable water by impairing recreation or ecological function. Id. at *9. The court 
decided:  
[The PTD] protects the Scott River and the public’s right to use the Scott River for 
trust purposes, including fishing, rafting and boating. It also protects the public’s 
right to use, enjoy and preserve the Scott River in its natural state and as a habitat 
for fish. If the extraction of groundwater near the Scott River adversely affects those 
rights, the public trust doctrine applies. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 219 See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54 (relying on the public trust to reject 
restrictions on public uses of beaches); see also State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 
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New Jersey upheld the public’s right to access a privately owned beach un-
der the PTD.220 In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 
a beach access group sued a private beach club that had excluded the public 
from using a dry-sand beach, asserting that this exclusion violated the pub-
lic trust.221 The trial court found for the beach access group, deciding that 
the public was entitled to a right of access, and a court of appeals affirmed 
that ruling.222 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also affirmed, ruling that the club 
must allow public use of the beach, subject to a fee for the club’s mainte-
nance of the beach, as approved by the state’s Department of Environmental 
Protection, under the PTD.223 Quoting an earlier New Jersey PTD beach 
case, the court explained: 
Exercise of the public’s right to swim and bathe below the mean 
high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the up-
land beach. Without some means of access the public right to use 
the foreshore would be meaningless. To say that the public trust 
doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean and to use the 
foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the public of a 
feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effective-
ly eliminate, the rights of the public trust doctrine.224 
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n thus relied on the PTD to prevent private mo-
nopolization of an upland dry-sand beach that would have limited public 
access to and enjoyment of the ocean. 
In 2015, the North Carolina Court of Appeals gave public trust protec-
tion to a publicly built, renourished dry-sand beach.225 A North Carolina stat-
ute claimed state ownership of dry-sand beaches replenished through dredg-
ing or other means, if the creation was publicly funded.226 The Town of Em-
                                                                                                                           
(Or. 1969) (holding that the state of Oregon could prevent landowners from enclosing a dry sand 
area contained within the legal description of their ocean-front property); id. at 678–79 (Denecke, 
J., concurring) (reaching the same conclusion, but on PTD grounds). For an additional discussion 
of this case and the pertinent concurring PTD opinion see Michael C. Blumm & Erika Doot, Ore-
gon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Rights in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENVTL. L. 375, 
408–10. 
 220 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005). 
 221 Id. at 113, 116. 
 222 Id. at 117–18. 
 223 Id. at 113. 
 224 Id. at 120 (quoting Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364). 
 225 Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 202. The court explained, “The ‘dry sand beach’ is the portion of the 
beach landward of the mean high water mark and continuing to the high water mark of the storm 
tide.” Id. at 190. 
 226 Id. at 191. North Carolina law specifically states: 
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erald Isle funded the development of a dry-sand beach in front of private 
property and prohibited driving on the renourished beach, asserting that the 
new beach was subject to the PTD.227 The property owners sued, arguing that 
the beach was not a public trust resource. But the trial court found in favor of 
the town.228 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that 
ocean beaches shoreward of the vegetation line are subject to the state’s 
PTD.229 Like other cases expanding the public trust inland, the decision pre-
vented landowner monopolization of an upland resource. 
3. Parks 
In some states, the PTD has fully emerged from the water, extending to 
parklands.230 For example, a half-century ago in the 1966 decision of Gould 
v. Greylock, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court treated a state park, 
the Greylock State Reservation, as a public trust resource.231 Five citizens, 
including Mildred Gould, sued the Greylock Reservation Commission (“the 
Commission”) because the Commission planned to allow construction of a 
                                                                                                                           
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the title to land in or immedi-
ately along the Atlantic Ocean raised above the mean high water mark by publicly 
financed projects which involve hydraulic dredging or other deposition of spoil ma-
terials or sand vests in the State. Title to such lands raised through projects that re-
ceived no public funding vests in the adjacent littoral proprietor. All such raised 
lands shall remain open to the free use and enjoyment of the people of the State, 
consistent with the public trust rights in ocean beaches, which rights are part of the 
common heritage of the people of this State. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2016). 
 227 Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 191–92. 
 228 Id. at 193. 
 229 Id. at 196–97. The North Carolina Court of Appeals explained:  
We adopt the test suggested in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(e): “Natural indicators of the 
landward extent of the ocean beaches include, but are not limited to, the first line of 
stable, natural vegetation; the toe of the frontal dune; and the storm trash line.” . . . For 
the purposes of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20, the landward boundary of North Carolina 
ocean beaches is the discernable reach of the “storm” tide. This boundary represents 
the extent of semi-regular submersion of land by ocean waters sufficient to prevent the 
seaward expansion of frontal dunes, or stable, natural vegetation, where such dunes or 
vegetation exist. Where both frontal dunes and natural vegetation exist, the high water 
mark shall be the seaward of the two lines. Where no frontal dunes nor stable, natural 
vegetation exists, the high water mark shall be determined by some other reasonable 
method, which may involve determination of the “storm trash line” or any other relia-
ble indicator of the mean regular extent of the storm tide. The ocean beaches of North 
Carolina, as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(e) and this opinion, are subject to 
public trust rights unless those rights have been expressly abandoned by the State. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 230 See Reed, supra note 189, at 107, 116–17 (discussing upland PTD cases). See generally 
Keith, supra note 198 (discussing upland PTD cases). 
 231 See 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
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large ski resort extending into the reservation, arguing that the proposed 
expansion violated the PTD.232 The court agreed with Gould, concluding 
that the statutes governing the Commission did not authorize the convey-
ance.233 Using the PTD to interpret the statute,234 the court explained that 
the Greylock reservation “is not to be diverted to another inconsistent pub-
lic use without plain and explicit legislation to that end. . . .The policy of 
the Commonwealth has been to add to the common law inviolability of 
parks’ express prohibition against encroachment.”235 The court decided that 
because the statutes did not expressly allow the Commission to permit de-
velopment of a ski resort, issuing the lease violated the state’s PTD.236 
Gould was the first decision to apply the PTD to an inland park, thus pre-
venting private monopolization of public park resources and preserving 
them for public use.237 
In ensuing years, other courts have extended PTD antimonopoly pro-
tection to parks.238 In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals prohibited state 
agencies from using parklands for parking vehicles, affirming a lower court 
decision that deemed this storage use inconsistent with park purposes, and 
thus violative of the public trust.239 As the court explained, “[d]edicated 
park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust and their use for 
other than park purposes, either for a period of years or permanently, re-
                                                                                                                           
 232 See id. at 116. The proposed resort on Mount Greylock was to become highly developed, 
“with a large activity center at the base of the mountain including an access road, a swimming 
pool, restaurant, fireplace, barbecue pit, bar, sun deck, summer dance terrace, ski shop, gift shop, 
ski rental and repair room, and parking space for [two thousand] automobiles.” Id. at 120. 
 233 Id. 
 234 See generally William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-
Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Envi-
ronmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 439–41 (1997) (discussing courts’ interpretations of 
statutory PTDs). 
 235 Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 121 (internal quotation omitted). 
 236 Id. at 126; see Sax, supra note 2, at 491–95 (1970) (discussing Gould in detail). 
 237 See 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
 238 See, e.g., Cty. of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal. App. 4th 566, 576 (Ct. App. 2007) (relying 
on the PTD grounds to prevent a county from disposing of land used for a county fair); Big Sur 
Properties v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 3d 99, 107 (Ct. App. 1976) (relying on the PTD to prevent con-
veyance of a private right-of-way across park land); Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of N.Y., No. 
0031145-06, WL 6916531, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013) (relying, in an unreported case, on 
the PTD to prevent New York City from allowing construction of a solid waste management facil-
ity on park lands). 
 239 Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d 489 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 
1985) (mem.). The agencies stored approximately 100 vehicles, including snow removal equip-
ment, as well as other materials and physical improvements, on part of Cunningham Park. Id. 
Citizens sued to have the agencies remove the vehicles, materials, and improvements, and the trial 
court dismissed their suit. Id. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the agencies had vio-
lated the PTD by using the park for a non-park purpose and ordered removal of the equipment. Id. 
at 557–58.  
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quires the direct and specific approval of the State Legislature, plainly con-
ferred,” which had not occurred.240 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. For example, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals relied on the PTD to enjoin a city from allowing a 
developer to use property dedicated for a public library for commercial pur-
poses.241 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a trial court 
decision that set aside a city’s conveyance of parklands to the University of 
Pennsylvania, concluding that the city held the parklands as part of the pub-
lic trust, and thus could not convey them.242 And the Illinois Supreme Court 
ruled that citizens may challenge conveyances of parklands.243 These deci-
sions interpreting the PTD to include parklands all reflect the doctrine’s an-
timonopoly tenets, preventing privatization of public inland resources. 
4. Wildlife 
The United States Supreme Court recognized wildlife as a trust re-
source in Geer v. Connecticut in 1896.244 In the years since Geer, the vast 
majority of states have used public trust language to refer to their sovereign 
ownership of wild animals, and many states have expressly recognized a 
public trust in wildlife.245 
For example, in Owsichek v. Guide Licensing & Control Board, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska held in 1988 that wild animals are part of that 
state’s PTD.246 The state Guide Licensing and Control Board (“the Board”) 
created exclusive guide areas that hunting guide Kenneth Owsichek chal-
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. at 558. 
 241 Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 215 Cal. App. 3d 
1003, 1017 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 242 Bd. of Tr. of Phila. Museum v. Tr. of Univ. of Pa., 96 A. 123, 126 (Pa. 1915). 
 243 Paepcke v. Pub. Building Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970). In another recent 
Illinois PTD park case, a federal court allowed a case to go forward that challenged construction 
of a museum on parklands on PTD grounds. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 14-cv-
09096, 2015 WL 1188615, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2015). The Chicago Park District agreed to 
allow construction of a George Lucas “Star Wars” museum on a parking lot in Burnham Park, but 
a public interest group challenged that agreement as a violation of the PTD, arguing that convey-
ance of the parking lot was impermissible. Id. at *1. The Chicago Park District moved to dismiss, 
but the court denied that motion as it applied to the PTD. Id. at *1, *7. In the wake of the court’s 
decision, Lucas dropped plans to site the museum in Chicago. Alex Stedman, George Lucas 
Drops Plans for Museum in Chicago, VARIETY (June 25, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://variety.com/
2016/film/news/george-lucas-museum-chicago-drops-plans-1201803673/ [https://perma.cc/T63V-
V9SW]. 
 244 161 U.S. at 529. 
 245 See id.; Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1471–73 (identifying twenty-two states that 
have expressly adopted a wildlife PTD, as well as twenty-two other states that use trust-like lan-
guage to describe their sovereign ownership of wildlife). 
 246 Owsichek v. Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988). 
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lenged as unconstitutional, although not on the basis of Alaska’s PTD.247 
The trial court upheld the Board’s action, and Owsichek appealed.248 The 
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the trust “impose[d] upon the state a 
trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for 
the benefit of all the people,”249 preventing the Board from creating exclu-
sive guide areas allowing select guides to exclude competitors.250 Since 
Owsichek, the Alaska Supreme Court has acknowledged the state’s wildlife 
trust in a number of other opinions.251 
In 2008, the California Court of Appeals upheld the state’s public trust 
in wildlife and also concluded that members of the public had standing to 
challenge state wildlife management under the PTD in Center for Biologi-
cal Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc.252 Environmentalists sued a number of pri-
vate wind energy owners and operators in California, alleging that more 
than five thousand wind turbines in Altamont Pass had killed tens of thou-
sands of birds since the 1980s, and that the operators had violated the PTD 
and numerous state statutes.253 The environmentalists claimed that the bird 
deaths were due in large part to the operators’ outdated turbines, and they 
challenged the government’s decision to renew the operators’ permits.254 
A trial court dismissed the case ruling that the environmentalists lacked 
standing to sue a private party for violation of the public trust,255 and the 
California Court of Appeal affirmed.256 However, the appellate court stated 
                                                                                                                           
 247 Id. at 488–91. 
 248 Id. at 491. 
 249 Id. at 495. 
 250 Id. at 496. 
 251 See, e.g., Pebble Ltd. P’ship. ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1074 
(Alaska 2009) (explaining that “common law principles incorporated in the common use clause 
impose upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for 
the benefit of all the people” (quoting Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60)) (citation omitted); Anchorage Citi-
zens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 424 (Alaska 2006) (Observing 
that the Alaska Constitution imposes a “public trust responsibility . . . to take care of fish, wildlife, 
and water resources of the state . . . . [C]onclud[ing] that ‘naturally occurring salmon are, like 
other state natural resources, state assets belonging to the state . . . for the benefit of all its peo-
ple.’” (quoting Pullen, 923 P.2d at 61); Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1030–31 (Alaska 1999) 
(noting that the Alaska Constitution made the state the trustee of wildlife); Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60–
61 (noting that the PTD “compel[s] the conclusion that fish occurring in their natural state are 
property of the state for purposes of carrying out its trust responsibilities . . . the state’s interest in 
salmon migrating in state and inland waters warrant[s] characterizing such salmon as assets of the 
state which may not be appropriated”) (internal citation omitted). 
 252 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 600–01 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 253 Id. at 592. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. According to the trial court, “No statutory or common law authority supports a cause of 
action by a private party for violation of the public trust doctrine arising from the destruction of 
wild animals.” Id. 
 256 Id. at 604–05. 
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that the public could sue the state to enforce the sovereign’s obligation to 
conserve wildlife as a public trust resource,257 and thus resist monopoliza-
tion of wildlife resources. 
5. The Atmosphere 
Groups of individual children recently filed suits, asking state and feder-
al courts to recognize an “atmospheric trust”—that is, a trust to protect the 
atmosphere from the harms of human-induced climate change.258 In seeking 
to require agencies to respond to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions causing 
climate change, the children claim that the PTD limits private activities that 
cause emissions to harm the atmosphere and thus the public. Courts in Alas-
ka, New Mexico, Minnesota, Iowa, and Montana have dismissed such cases 
for lack of justiciability.259 The Alaska court suggested, however, that the re-
sult might be different if the children could show that GHG emissions were 
causing damage to trust resources like coastal tidelands and wetlands.260 
In 2015, a Washington trial court concluded that since that state 
acknowledged that GHG emissions had deleterious effects on the state’s 
water resources, including navigable waters, the PTD could impose limits 
on GHG emissions.261 In April 2016, the Washington trial court ordered the 
state Department of Ecology to promulgate an emissions reduction rule by 
the end of the year and by 2017 make recommendations to the state legisla-
ture on science-based GHG reductions.262 Similarly, in 2016, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court found in favor of atmospheric trust plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                                           
 257 Id. at 600–01 (“The interests encompassed by the public trust undoubtedly are protected 
by public agencies acting pursuant to their police power and explicit statutory authorization. 
Nonetheless, the public retains the right to bring actions to enforce the trust when the public agen-
cies fail to discharge their duties.”). 
 258 See Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/us/federal-
lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6QNS-KSL7] (providing updated information on such litigation). See 
generally Mary Christina Wood & Daniel M. Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making 
the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259 (2015) (argu-
ing that the PTD protects a viable climate system and outlining so-called atmospheric trust litiga-
tion). 
 259 See e.g., Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014); Filippone v. 
Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585, 
2012 WL 4476642, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); Barhaugh v. Mont., No. OP 11-0258 (Mont. 
Sup. Ct. June 15, 2011) (mem.), http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case=14512 [https://
perma.cc/TS4M-N977]; Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
 260 Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1103. 
 261 Foster ex rel. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 
7721362 at *3–4 (Wash. Super. Nov. 19, 2015). 
 262 Foster ex rel. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at *20 (Wash. 
Super, Apr. 29, 2016), http://westernlaw.org/sites/default/files/2016.04.29-WA%20ATL%20Final%
20Decision%20Bench%20Ruling%20Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYW7-8HEX]. 
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stating that the state’s Department of Environmental Protection had failed to 
carry out its statutory trust duties and ordered the agency to reduce annual 
GHG emissions.263 
Also in 2016, the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon declined to dismiss an atmospheric trust case against the federal gov-
ernment.264 The children-plaintiffs claimed that the federal government 
knows that carbon dioxide pollution causes catastrophic climate change, 
including ocean acidification, but failed to curtail fossil fuel emissions and 
allowed increased carbon pollution.265 They maintained that a series of gov-
ernment actions and inactions had violated the PTD as well as federal con-
stitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clause.266 The government 
and several interveners involved in the manufacturing and petrochemical 
development industries sought to dismiss the case, asserting that the PTD 
provides no cognizable federal cause of action.267 The federal government 
also maintained that the PTD was a state law doctrine, inapplicable to the 
federal government,268 an argument that earlier succeeded in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.269 However, an Oregon magistrate judge disagreed with that proposi-
                                                                                                                           
 263 Kain v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1142 (Mass. 2016). 
 264 Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, at *23–24 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016), http://our
childrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/16.04.08.OrderDenyingMTD.pdf [https://perma.cc/N45R-5SLS]. 
For an update on the case, see infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text, in the Postscript to this 
Article. 
 265 Id. at *2. 
 266 Id. The court explained:  
Plaintiffs assert the actions and omissions of defendants that increased CO2 emissions 
“shock the conscience,” and are infringing the plaintiffs’ right to life and liberty in vio-
lation of their substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs also allege defendants have vio-
lated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights embedded in the Fifth Amendment by denying 
them protections afforded to previous generations and by favoring short term economic 
interests of certain citizens. Plaintiffs further allege defendants’ acts and omissions vio-
late the implicit right, via the Ninth Amendment, to a stable climate and an ocean and 
atmosphere free from dangerous levels of [carbon dioxide]. Finally, plaintiffs allege 
defendants have violated a public trust doctrine, secured by the Ninth Amendment, by 
denying future generations’ essential natural resources. 
Id. 
 267 Id. at *4. The defendants also asserted that the youths lacked standing to bring suit, raised 
non-justiciable political questions, and failed to state a constitutional claim. Id. 
 268 Id. at *17–18; see id. at *20 (Explaining that the plaintiff’s claim “does not at all implicate 
the equal footing doctrine or public trust obligations of the State of Oregon. The public trust doc-
trine invoked instead is directed against the United States and its unique sovereign interests over 
the territorial ocean waters and atmosphere of the nation.”). 
 269 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) aff’d sub. nom. Alec L. ex rel. 
Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.). In 2012, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an atmospheric trust claim against the federal gov-
ernment, ruling that the question was a matter of state law. Id. The plaintiff-children alleged that 
federal agencies violated the public trust “by contributing to and allowing unsafe amounts of 
greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere” and asked the court to declare that the agencies’ 
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tion, concluding that the federal government at least has public trust obliga-
tions concerning effects on trust resources that it controls, such as territorial 
seas.270 Thus the court declined to dismiss the youths’ PTD claim.271 The 
litigation is ongoing at the time of writing.272 
As this discussion illustrates—and consistent with Holmes’ famous 
dictum about the law reflecting the “felt necessities of the times”273—the 
scope of the American PTD has extended to an increasing number of natural 
resources, including traditionally non-navigable waters, uplands like beach-
es and parklands, groundwater, and even the atmosphere where it affects 
more traditional trust resources like navigable waters. In each instance, 
courts have protected public use of natural resources, guarding against gov-
ernment approval of privatization that could divest or injure public rights. 
C. Preventing Privatization of Public Trust Resources 
State courts have reinforced the PTD’s sovereign restraint against al-
ienating public resources, subject to the exceptions concerning conveyances 
that either serve public trust purposes or do not substantially impair public 
use of remaining trust resources.274 This non-alienation principle is an anti-
monopoly concept with deep historical roots, and it continues to serve as a 
hallmark of the PTD. 
1. Restraining Alienation of the Beds of Navigable Waters 
In 1976, in People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District, the Illinois 
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that conveyed nearly 200 acres of 
                                                                                                                           
violation of the PTD ignored their duty to reduce global atmospheric carbon dioxide levels main-
taining that the case arose from federal public trust law. Id. at 14–15. The court disagreed, con-
cluding that the PTD is a matter of state—not federal—law. Id. at 15. Consequently, the court 
dismissed the case, also opining that the issue of an atmospheric trust was essentially an unre-
viewable political question. See id. at 17. The D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed in an unreflective 
opinion. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.). For criticism 
of these opinions, see Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 3, at 400–02, 409. 
 270 Juliana, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, at *21–23. The court explained: 
At this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot say that the public trust doctrine 
does not provide at least some substantive due process protections for some plain-
tiffs within the navigable water areas of Oregon. Accordingly, the court should not 
dismiss any claims under the public trust doctrine to that extent. 
Id. at *23. 
 271 Id. at *23–24. While this article was in press, the district court affirmed the magistrate 
judge’s decision. See infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text. 
 272 See infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text (discussing the ensuing decision by the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon). 
 273 HOLMES, supra note 24, at 1. 
 274 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; see supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
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lakebed to a private company, concluding that it had violated the PTD.275 
The statute at issue conveyed roughly 195 acres of lands submerged beneath 
Lake Michigan, enabling U.S. Steel to expand a plant, for just under twenty 
thousand dollars.276 The Illinois Attorney General filed suit against the 
company and the Chicago Park District, asking the trial court to invalidate 
the statute, and it did so, preventing the conveyance.277 On appeal, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court also agreed with the Illinois Attorney General, stating 
that the state “holds title to submerged land . . . in trust for the people,” and 
that “governmental powers over these lands will not be relinquished.”278 
The court suggested that conveyances of significant natural resources war-
ranted strict scrutiny, noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had never up-
held a grant whose primary purpose was to benefit a private interest.279 
Echoing the sentiment that the PTD is responsive to changing conditions 
and values,280 the court concluded that the conveyance of the submerged 
lands adjacent to public beaches would “irretrievably remove [those areas] 
from the use of the people of Illinois,” thereby impairing public use of Lake 
Michigan.281 
                                                                                                                           
 275 360 N.E.2d at 780–81. 
 276 Id. at 775. The Illinois Supreme Court explained: 
The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 782 on June 17, 1963, and it was signed 
by the Governor on June 26, 1963. The bill, in essence, provided for the conveyance 
by the State of Illinois of 194.6 acres of land submerged in waters of Lake Michigan 
to the United States Steel Corporation . . . upon its paying to the State Treasurer 
$19,460 and upon the Chicago Park District re-conveying to the State an interest in 
the land it had received by certain legislation. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). The conveyance of the submerged lands at issue in Illinois Central 
was more than one thousand acres, over five times as large. 146 U.S. at 454. 
 277 Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 775. 
 278 Id. at 779. 
 279 Id. at 780. The court explained:  
Courts in general have shown great circumspection in considering grants of this 
character . . . . It is obvious that Lake Michigan is a valuable natural resource be-
longing to the people of this State in perpetuity and any attempted ceding of a por-
tion of it in favor of a private interest has to withstand a most critical examination.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 280 Id. (Explaining “there has developed a strong, though belated, interest in conserving natu-
ral resources and in protecting and improving our physical environment. The public has become 
increasingly concerned with dangers to health and life from environmental sources and more sen-
sitive to the value and, frequently, the irreplaceability, of natural resources.”). 
 281 Id. at 780–81. The court also dismissed the steel company’s defense that the conveyance 
of the lakebed would provide public benefits of employment and economic improvement because 
those public benefits would be merely “incidental” to the dominant purpose of furthering the steel 
company’s interest. Id. at 781 (“Any benefit here to the public would be incidental. We judge that 
the direct and dominating purpose here would be a private one.”). 
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Similarly, in 1990, in Lake Michigan Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, a federal district court declared that the state of Illinois had vio-
lated that PTD when it granted part of Lake Michigan’s bed for an expan-
sion of a college campus.282 The state legislature had conveyed submerged 
Lake Michigan lands to Loyola University of Chicago (“Loyola” or “the 
university”) to fill eighteen-and-a-half acres of lakebed and build an athletic 
facility, bike and walking paths, and a lawn.283 The university planned to 
grant public access to the latter areas, but only subject to conditions.284 The 
court distilled three basic principles from public trust case law: 
First, courts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender 
valuable public resources to a private entity. Second, the public 
trust is violated when the primary purpose of a legislative grant is 
to benefit a private interest. Finally, any attempt by the state to re-
linquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated 
under the doctrine.285 
Applying these essential principles, the court decided that the grant of the 
lakebed to Loyola violated the PTD because the conveyance primarily ben-
efited the university while relinquishing public control over the eighteen-
and-a-half acres of publicly held lakebed.286 The decision thus prevented 
private monopolization of public trust lands. 
Judicial restraints on alienation of trust resources have also been com-
monplace in other states. For example, in 1991, in Arizona Center for Law 
in the Public Interest v. Hassell, the Arizona Court of Appeals invalidated a 
legislative grant of riverbed lands to private landowners.287 A state statute 
attempted to relinquish most of the state’s ownership of those lands.288 A 
public interest group challenged the statute under the state’s PTD, as well as 
a gift clause in the Arizona Constitution restricting governmental disposi-
                                                                                                                           
 282 742 F. Supp. at 442. 
 283 Id. at 443. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 445 (internal citations omitted). 
 286 Id. at 445–47. 
 287 Hassell, 837 P.2d at 174. 
 288 Id. at 161. The court explained:  
In 1985, Arizona officials upset longstanding assumptions about title to riverbed 
lands by asserting that the state owned all lands in the beds of Arizona watercourses 
that were navigable when Arizona was admitted to the Union. The 38th Arizona 
Legislature responded by enacting [a 1987 law] substantially relinquishing the 
state’s interest in such lands. The validity of that statute is the subject of this appeal. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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tion of public resources.289 The court relied on both to invalidate the state 
grant, explaining that the state must supply a public purpose and obtain fair 
consideration to the public before alienating public resources—particularly 
public trust resources, which must be managed for present and future gener-
ations.290 The court declared “the state’s responsibility to administer its wa-
tercourse lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood 
itself.”291 Consequently, the state had to administer the riverbeds consistent 
with public trust purposes.292 Because the legislature had failed to assess the 
value of the riverbeds to present and future generations, the court held that 
the attempted riverbed conveyance violated the PTD.293 
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Clark County in 2011, the Nevada Supreme 
Court limited the ability of the state legislature to direct the Colorado River 
Commission to transfer lands to a county that included the dry riverbed and 
banks of the Colorado River.294 The state’s Land Registrar transferred most 
of the land as directed by the legislature but withheld three hundred thirty 
acres abutting the Colorado River, much of which was dry, because he be-
                                                                                                                           
 289 Id. at 163; see ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (“Neither the State, nor any county, city, town, 
municipality, or other subdivision of the State shall ever . . . make any donation or grant, by subsi-
dy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation . . . .”). 
 290 Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170. The court explained: 
The gift clause offers a well-established constitutional framework for judicial review 
of an attempted legislative transfer of a portion of the public trust. We hold that 
when a court reviews a dispensation of public trust property, as when a court re-
views the dispensation of any other property, the two Wistuber elements—public 
purpose and fair consideration—must be shown. The gift clause surely requires no 
less for public trust property than for other holdings of the state . . . . Yet public trust 
land is not like other property. As the Supreme Court said in Illinois Central, a 
state’s title to lands under navigable waters is different in character from that which 
the state holds in lands intended for sale. The state might sell ordinary property for 
fair consideration for the public purpose of enhancing the state fisc. Such a showing, 
however, would not suffice to validate a dispensation from the public trust. Because 
the state may not dispose of trust resources except for purposes consistent with the 
public’s right of use and enjoyment of those resources, any public trust dispensation 
must also satisfy the state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and 
enjoyment of present and future generations. 
Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 291 Id. at 168. 
 292 Id.; see also id. at 170 (“Because the state may not dispose of trust resources except for 
purposes consistent with the public’s right of use and enjoyment of those resources, any public 
trust dispensation must also satisfy the state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use 
and enjoyment of present and future generations.”). 
 293 Id. at 172–74 (considering “whether the dispensation satisfies the state’s special obligation 
to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations,” and concluding 
that “[t]he legislature established no basis to assess the value as a public resource of the parcels 
that it relinquished wholesale by its act,” and thus invalidating the law). 
 294 254 P.3d 606, 609, 617 (Nev. 2011). 
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lieved that the lands remained subject to the state’s PTD.295 The county filed 
suit, arguing that because the land was no longer submerged beneath navi-
gable water, it was not subject to the public trust.296 A trial court ruled in 
favor of the county, agreeing that the disputed land was not subject to the 
public trust because it was no longer within the current channel of the Colo-
rado River.297 The registrar appealed.298 
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, observing that “a state holds the 
banks and beds of navigable waterways in trust for the public and subject to 
restraints on alienability.”299 Interpreting both the state constitution and per-
tinent statutes,300 the court explained that the “public trust doctrine is . . . 
not simply common law easily abrogated by legislation; instead, the doc-
trine constitutes an inseverable restraint on the state’s sovereign power.”301 
The court therefore remanded the case to the lower court, instructing the 
court to determine whether the dry riverbed had been submerged beneath 
navigable water at statehood and, if so, whether the conveyance of trust 
lands was consistent with the PTD.302 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Id. at 608 
 296 Id. The registrar filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief, requesting a declaration that 
the land “was subject to the public trust doctrine and therefore was not transferable.” Id. 
 297 Id. Although Nevada had never expressly adopted the PTD, the court ruled that the tenets 
of the doctrine had been present in Nevada case law for at least forty years. See id. at 609; State v. 
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972); State Eng’r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159 (Nev. 
1970). 
 298 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 608. 
 299 Id. at 607. 
 300 Id. at 612–13; see NEV. CONST., art. VIII, § 9 (“The State shall not donate or loan money, 
or its credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corpora-
tion, except corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes.”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 321.0005 (2016) (“the policy of this State regarding the use of state lands to be that state lands 
must be used in the best interest of the residents of this State, and to that end the lands may be 
used for recreational activities, the production of revenue and other public purposes”); Id. 
§ 533.025 (“The water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether 
above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.”). 
 301 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613; see also id. (“In sum, although the public trust doctrine has 
roots in the common law, it is distinct from other common law principles because it is based on a 
policy reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes, and the inherent limitations on the 
state’s sovereign power, as recognized by Illinois Central.” (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 
453); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948 (interpreting Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution to 
affirm PTD rights as “inherent and indefeasible” components of citizenship (quoting Pap’s A.M. 
v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 603 (Pa. 2002)). 
 302 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 616–17. The Nevada Supreme Court found: 
Because we find the reasoning enunciated in Hassell persuasive and harmonious 
with our own gift clause and public trust jurisprudence, we adopt the Hassell ap-
proach to reviewing dispensations of public trust property. Accordingly, when as-
sessing such dispensations, courts of this state must consider (1) whether the dispen-
sation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the state received fair considera-
tion in exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the dispensation satisfies “the 
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2. Restraints on Alienation in State Constitutions 
The PTD is often entrenched in state constitutions, making legislative 
evasions difficult. For example, in 1999, building on principles established 
in the 1991 Arizona PTD case, Hassell,303 the Arizona Supreme Court again 
invoked the state’s constitutional PTD in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Supe-
rior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, invalidating a statute that purported 
to prohibit courts from considering the PTD in water rights adjudications.304 
The San Carlos Apache Tribe challenged the statute that governed rights in 
the state’s surface waters, and the trial court upheld the law.305 The tribe 
appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court reversed on public trust 
grounds,306 announcing: 
The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legisla-
tive power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its 
people. The Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doc-
trine inapplicable to these or any proceedings . . . . It is for the 
courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to 
the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the consti-
tutional limits on its authority.307 
The court consequently invalidated the statute, reading the PTD’s antimo-
nopoly principle into the state’s constitution.308 
In another constitutional PTD decision, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania invalidated parts of a state statute aimed at facilitating natural gas 
hydrofracturing (“fracking”) as violative of the PTD in Robinson Township 
                                                                                                                           
state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present 
and future generations.” 
Id. (citing and quoting Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170). 
 303 Hassell, 837 P.2d at 158; see supra notes 287–293 and accompanying text (discussing this 
case). 
 304 972 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. 1999). 
 305 Id. at 186, 199. The Arizona Supreme Court explained: 
The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication proceeding held 
pursuant to this article [of the Constitution]. In adjudicating the attributes of water 
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to whether 
public trust values are associated with any or all of the river system or source. 
Id. at 199 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-263(B) (1998)). 
 306 San Carlos Apache Tribe, 927 P.2d at 186. 
 307 Id. at 199 (citing Hassell, 837 P.2d at 166–68) (internal citation omitted) (applying both 
the separation of powers doctrine and the state’s constitutional gift clause). 
 308 Id. at 202 (invalidating a provision “making the public trust doctrine inapplicable to these 
proceedings”). 
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v. Commonwealth.309 The law, Act 13, prevented local governments from 
using land use authority to restrict fracking.310 Several municipalities chal-
lenged the law, claiming that fracking significantly harmed the environ-
ment, and thus that Act 13 violated Pennsylvania’s constitutional PTD.311 
Although the lower court dismissed the constitutional public trust claims,312 
it also ruled that some of the law’s provisions were an unconstitutional vio-
lation of substantive due process under the state constitution.313 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
invalidating provisions of Act 13 that preempted local ordinances, but a plu-
rality of the court did so on PTD grounds.314 The plurality decided that Penn-
sylvania’s constitutional public trust required the state “to prevent degrada-
tion, diminution, and depletion of our public natural resources, which it may 
satisfy by enacting legislation that adequately restrains actions of private par-
ties likely to cause harm to protected aspects of our environment.”315 Con-
                                                                                                                           
 309 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913. See generally John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings 
of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463 (2015) (detailing the significance of Robinson 
Twp., 83 A.3d 901, and anticipating the implications of recognizing the PTD in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution). 
 310 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915. 
 311 Id. at 913, 915–16; see PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania mandates:  
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natu-
ral, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations 
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 312 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 930. 
 313 Id. In Pennsylvania, substantive due process requires the legislature to act in the best inter-
est of the larger community and must balance competing concerns within this framework. Id. at 
931–32. A concurring opinion endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, agreeing that the stat-
ute’s preemption of local laws violated substantive due process by failing to protect the interests 
of neighboring property owners and changing the character of neighborhoods based on irrational 
classifications. Id. at 1001, 1002–03 (Baer, J. concurring). 
 314 Id. at 977–82 (plurality opinion). 
 315 Id. at 979; see also id. at 974 (“The Commonwealth’s obligations as trustee to conserve 
and maintain the public natural resources for the benefit of the people, including generations yet to 
come, create a right in the people to seek to enforce the obligations.”). The court explained: 
As trustee, the Commonwealth is a fiduciary obligated to comply with the terms of 
the trust and with standards governing a fiduciary’s conduct. The explicit terms of 
the trust require the government to conserve and maintain the corpus of the trust. 
The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty to prevent 
and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural re-
sources. As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a duty to act toward the corpus of 
the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality. 
Id. at 957 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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trary to that public trust directive, the statute’s goals were not to “effectuate 
the constitutional goal to protect and preserve Pennsylvania’s natural envi-
ronment,” but instead to “provide a maximally favorable environment for 
industry operators to exploit Pennsylvania’s oil and gas resources . . . .”316 
As the plurality explained: 
The public natural resources implicated by the “optimal” accom-
modation of industry here are resources essential to life, health, 
and liberty: surface and ground water, ambient air, and aspects of 
the natural environment in which the public has an interest. As the 
citizens illustrate, development of the natural gas industry in the 
Commonwealth unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and 
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality of these core as-
pects of Pennsylvania’s environment, which are part of the public 
trust. . . . By any responsible account, the exploitation of the Mar-
cellus Shale Formation will produce a detrimental effect on the 
environment, on the people, their children, and future generations, 
and potentially on the public purse. . . .317 
Consequently, the court struck down Act 13’s preemption of local zoning 
requirements as unconstitutional, although only a plurality thought that the 
law had violated the public trust provision in the state constitution.318 
                                                                                                                           
 316 Id. at 975. 
 317 Id. at 975–76. The court elaborated: 
The industry uses two techniques that enhance recovery of natural gas from these 
“unconventional” gas wells: hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” . . . and horizontal 
drilling. Both techniques inevitably do violence to the landscape. Slick-water frack-
ing involves pumping at high pressure into the rock formation a mixture of sand and 
freshwater treated with a gel friction reducer, until the rock cracks, resulting in 
greater gas mobility. Horizontal drilling requires the drilling of a vertical hole to 
[5500 to 6500] feet—several hundred feet above the target natural gas pocket or res-
ervoir—and then directing the drill bit through an arc until the drilling proceeds 
sideways or horizontally. One unconventional gas well in the Marcellus Shale uses 
several million gallons of water. 
Id. at 914–15. 
 318 Id. at 977–78. The court explained: 
The Commonwealth, by the General Assembly, declares in Section 3303 [of Act 13] 
that environmental obligations related to the oil and gas industries are of statewide 
concern and, on that basis, the Commonwealth purports to preempt the regulatory 
field to the exclusion of all local environmental legislation that might be perceived 
as affecting oil and gas operations. Act 13 thus commands municipalities to ignore 
their [public trust] obligations under Article I, Section 27 [of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution] and further directs municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo exist-
ing protections of the environment in their localities. The police power, broad as it 
may be, does not encompass such authority to so fundamentally disrupt these expec-
tations respecting the environment. 
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The plurality saw the law’s prohibition of new zoning ordinances as in-
consistent with the PTD because it prevented local governments from protect-
ing vulnerable trust resources in local neighborhoods.319 Chief Justice Castille 
explained that the effect of Act 13 was to impermissibly harm the properties 
and communities most affected by the environmental hazards associated with 
fracking.320 As he declared, “[t]his disparate effect is irreconcilable with the 
express command that the trustee will manage the corpus of the [public] trust 
for the benefit of ‘all the people.’ A trustee must treat all beneficiaries equita-
bly in light of the purposes of the trust.”321 Underlying Robinson Township is 
a strong antimonopoly sentiment affirming local community control over pri-
vatization of natural gas resources affecting groundwater. 
As these decisions illustrate, restraints on government alienation of 
public resources, first established in Illinois Central, remain alive and vi-
brant.322 As in Illinois Central, alienation restraints protect public access to 
trust resources, preventing private monopolies that would interfere with 
public use.323 They also require public oversight for private uses of trust 
resources to ensure against unnecessary degradation that harms the public. 
                                                                                                                           
Id. The other member of the majority thought Act 13 violated substantive due process. Id. at 1001 
(Baer, J., concurring); see Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609, 617. 
 319 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979–82. 
 320 Id. at 980–82. In describing Act 13, the court explained: 
[The] requirement that local government permit industrial uses in all zoning districts 
is that some properties and communities will carry much heavier environmental and 
habitability burdens than others . . . . Imposing statewide environmental and habita-
bility standards appropriate for the heaviest of industrial areas in sensitive zoning 
districts lowers environmental and habitability protections for affected residents and 
property owners below the existing threshold and permits significant degradation of 
public natural resources. The outright ban on local regulation of oil and gas opera-
tions (such as ordinances seeking to conform development to local conditions) that 
would mitigate the effect, meanwhile, propagates serious detrimental and disparate 
effects on the corpus of the [public] trust. 
Id. at 980–81. Further, the court explained:  
In Pennsylvania, terrain and natural conditions frequently differ throughout a munic-
ipality, and from municipality to municipality. As a result, the impact on the quality, 
quantity, and well-being of our natural resources cannot reasonably be assessed on 
the basis of a statewide average. Protection of environmental values, in this respect, 
is a quintessential local issue that must be tailored to local conditions. 
Id. at 979. 
 321 Id. at 980 (internal citation omitted). 
 322 See supra notes 94–116 and accompanying text (discussing this case and its future impli-
cations). 
 323 See supra notes 94–116 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
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CONCLUSION 
The American PTD is rooted in long-held antimonopoly sentiment. 
From its inception in U.S. law in the early nineteenth century, the doctrine 
has protected the public against state attempts to create private monopolies 
over natural resources, beginning with oyster harvesting in tidal waters and 
soon extending inland to navigable waters and wildlife.324 In the United 
States Supreme Court’s seminal decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois, the Court held that the PTD prevented the state from sanctioning pri-
vate monopolization of Chicago Harbor, thus preserving the harbor and 
lakefront for present and future public use.325 Ensuing case law invoked the 
PTD to combat private threats to other important natural resources, includ-
ing non-tidal and traditionally non-navigable waters, as well as wildlife and 
upland resources like beaches and parklands.326 Courts are now being asked 
to consider antimonopoly protection for additional public resources, includ-
ing groundwater and the atmosphere.327 
The PTD found footing in American jurisprudence nearly two centu-
ries ago.328 Although commentators have written extensively about the doc-
trine’s development and significance,329 the antimonopoly roots of the PTD 
have not been closely examined. Public trust advocates seeking to enforce 
or expand the scope of the doctrine should ground the PTD in its deep anti-
monopoly origins, which help to clarify the basis of the widespread senti-
ment that certain natural resources have public values too significant to be 
subject to exclusive private control.330 
  
                                                                                                                           
 324 See supra notes 38–92 and accompanying text (discussing early public trust cases that 
prevented landowner monopolization of wildlife resources in tidal waters). 
 325 See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
 326 See supra notes 107–257 and accompanying text (reviewing twentieth and twenty-first 
century public trust cases that strengthen restraints on alienation of natural resources and expand 
protection to various non-traditional resources). 
 327 See supra 258–273 and accompanying text (discussing the claimed public trust in the at-
mosphere, which seeks to prevent further climate change). 
 328 See supra notes 38–92 and accompanying text (reviewing the earliest nineteenth-century 
public trust cases). 
 329 For example, a recent Westlaw search for secondary sources with “public trust” in their 
titles yielded 437 results (last searched June 26, 2016). 
 330 See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (“To hand over . . . lakes 
to private ownership . . . would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which 
cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.”); see also supra notes 129–139 and accompanying text 
(discussing Lamprey). 
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POSTSCRIPT 
On November 10, 2016, the United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon refused to dismiss Juliana v. United States, a case brought by 
twenty-one youth plaintiffs asserting that the federal government violated 
their constitutional due process rights to life, liberty, and property, as well 
as the government’s duty to manage public resources in trust for the people 
and for future generations.331 The government jeopardized these rights, the 
youths claimed, by fossil fuel policies that threaten a healthful atmosphere, 
thereby threatening human life, causing widespread property damage, and 
dramatically altering the earth’s ecosystems.332 By allowing the claim to 
proceed, Judge Ann Aiken rejected the government’s claim that the case 
represented a non-justiciable political question, upheld the children’s stand-
ing to sue, and ruled that the children had stated a valid claim based on the 
government’s alleged interference with fundamental due process rights.333 
 The court also ruled that the government had a PTD duty to protect 
trust property, including the territorial seas.334 Because greenhouse gas pol-
lution of the atmosphere produces ocean acidification and rising ocean tem-
peratures, it jeopardizes trust resources, including “at a minimum, the terri-
torial seas.”335  Interpreting the PTD as grounded in, and enforceable 
through, the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause,336 the court stated, “no 
government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”337 Judge 
Aiken found a valid PTD claim in the plaintiffs’ assertion that government 
“nominally retain[ed] control over trust assets while actually allowing their 
depletion and destruction,”338 and applied the PTD to the federal govern-
                                                                                                                           
 331 Juliana v. United States, No. 15-ev-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146, *2–3 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 
2016). The court was cognizant of the importance of the issues before it from the outset.  See id. at 
*3 (“This is no ordinary lawsuit.”). 
 332 Id. at *16. Concerning the due process right, the court relied upon the precedents of Roe v. 
Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges. Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *15; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (recognizing a fundamental right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (recognizing a fundamental right to an abortion). The court also located 
the fundamental right to a healthy environment in the Ninth Amendment. Juliana, 2016 WL 
6661146 at *15. 
 333 Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *3–9 (discussing the political question), *9–14 (discussing 
standing), *14–17 (discussing due process). 
 334 Id. at *20. 
 335 Id. at *20–21. 
 336 Id. at *25 (noting that fundamental rights are those that are implicit in ordered liberty or 
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition (citing McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 
761, 767 (2010)). 
 337 Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *18. 
 338 Id. at *19–21. 
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ment.339 Further, she ruled that the PTD was not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution’s Property Clause340 and was not displaced by federal statutes like 
the Clean Air and Water Acts.341 The court accurately described the PTD as 
one of the “inherent aspects of sovereignty” preserved by but not created by 
the Constitution.342 
 Juliana may also be framed in antimonopoly policy terms.343 The 
effect of federal actions and inaction over the decades have created an im-
permissible atmospheric monopoly enjoyed by fossil-fuel polluters at the 
expense of the general public, dependent on the atmosphere for life and a 
healthy environment.344  The decision means that the case will proceed to 
trial or settlement concerning whether the government’s actions concerning 
atmospheric pollution actually violated the children’s due process and PTD 
rights. 
                                                                                                                           
 339 Id. at *23–24 (finding unpersuasive a decision to the contrary in Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. 
Supp. 2d 11, 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) aff’d sub. nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. 
App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.)). The court explained:  
[E]ven though Illinois Central interpreted Illinois law, its central tenets could be ap-
plied broadly . . . because it “invoked the principle in American law recognizing the 
weighty public interests in submerged lands.” . . . There is no reason why the central 
tenets of Illinois Central should apply to another state, but not to the federal gov-
ernment. 
Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *44–45 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285 
(1997)). See generally Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 3 (arguing that Illinois Central was not 
based on Illinois state law). 
 340 Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *23 (Noting that although Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 
529, 539 (1976), stated that the Property Clause was “without limitations” the Court did not have 
the issue of whether federal authority to manage public lands despite violating “individual consti-
tutional rights or run afoul of public trust obligations.”). 
 341 Id. at *24 (distinguishing American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 
(2001), which ruled that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance claims). 
 342 Id. at *25. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the “obligation . . . cannot be legislated 
away.” Id. at *24; see also id. at *25 (“Governments, in turn, possess certain powers that permit 
them to safeguard the rights of the people, these powers are inherent in the authority to govern and 
cannot be sold or bargained away.”). 
 343 See Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *18–19. 
 344 See id. at *26. Judge Aiken closed by stating that federal courts “have been . . . overly 
deferential in the area of environmental law, and the world has suffered for it . . . .” Id. (citing 
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Federal Judges, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 785, 785–86, 
788). Judge Goodwin was the author of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, ruling that the doctrine of 
custom protected the public’s use of Oregon ocean beaches. 462 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. 1969); see 
Blumm & Doot, supra note 219, at 407–09. (discussing the Hay decision). 
